Dave Crocker wrote:
There is a difference between noting that the IETF specification is in
flux, versus predicting that the IETF will produce a final
specification that breaks the ability to have a signer who uses the
pre-ietf spec be validated by an implementor of the post-ietf draft.
I don't think there's anything that prevents an implementor of the
post-ietf draft from verifying an allman-01 signature. You can tell
which is being used by looking for the presence/absence of the hash
tag/value in the signature header field.
So far, we have not modified DKIM to cause this breakage. The current
proposal will cause this breakage.
I would be considerably more concerned if there was some
non-self-evident change to the signature, like if we had decided to hash
the body before the signed header fields, and had not also incremented
the signature version number.
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to