On Oct 7, 2004, at 12:24 PM, domainkeys-feedbackbase01(_at_)yahoo(_dot_)com
--- Andrew Newton <andy(_at_)hxr(_dot_)us> wrote:
On Oct 7, 2004, at 2:49 AM, domainkeys-feedbackbase01(_at_)yahoo(_dot_)com
S/MIME is not a common building block in any significant
email program that deals with Internet email.
Except for Outlook and Mozilla based MUAs. That's a lot of programs.
Come on Andy; the discussion clearly relates to internet email
programs - those that are most interested and are most likely to be
participants in MASS. Citing Mozilla and Outlook in this context is
sway MTA authors.
You clearly said "email program" and mentioned Yahoo and AOL. If you
were simply talking about MTAs then excuse me, but I do not think you
were being clear. Besides, components of Mozilla and OpenSSL are
readily available to MTA authors.
Given your statement above, I doubt this would do much to change your
Not so. All I'm suggesting is that nothing less than real-world,
evidence, is what is needed prior to making credible claims in MASS
you think anyone will be sufficiently convinced with less than that?
So you'll accept reducing the scope to no new email protocols if I (or
somebody else) can demonstrate that it can be done?
Well, if you've got data or hard-core experience suggesting that
(or PGP) will not work, let's hear it. You've obviously got some deep
prejudice against S/MIME. If it has a problem, I do not want to use
The deep prejudice has been identified numerous times.
I realize that I am often slow and daft, so can you provide pointers?
The trivial part of MASS is the engineering. As others have said, the
of MASS is convincing a huge deployment to change. Expounding on the
of S/MIME is not an agent of change - it's merely flailing on an IETF
list. Something I promise not to do to further.
Finally, something we can agree upon. The thing that is new here and
is the agent of change is the key distribution and not the method of
providing email signatures.