On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 14:30:08 +0200, Imad R Faiad said:
Let me add, and no offence of course, from the fact that you are
relegating those short-lifetime signing sub keys to a less secure
environment, I infer that you have no confidence in them, so how
There is a huge difference in chances to get compromised between a
networked and daily used box and a non-networked box somewhere else
used only for certification. You can't remotely attack that
certification box as long as you take simple precautions like
transferring the data on a floppy etc.
All software has bugs and there are almost always known or not yet
known exploits. Cutting the connection between a possible attacker by
manually transferring data is a sound precaution against most exploits
- it would be a bit annoying for the bulk of everydays work, though.
Werner Koch <wk(_at_)gnupg(_dot_)org>
The GnuPG Experts http://g10code.com
Free Software Foundation Europe http://fsfeurope.org