vedaal(_at_)hush(_dot_)com wrote:
the point is,
can there be an additonal packet feature that somehow distinguishes
a signed and encrypted message, from a clearsigned one
Signed is signed, regardless of how it was then later
transmitted.
What you appear to be asking for is a recipient-based
signature.
That is, Alice and Bob can sign messages to each other,
knowing that each can verify the signatures, but they
can't reliably prove this to others. Hence, leakages
reduce to the same status as made up claims.
(I believe this is done relatively easily with MACs based
on previous key exchanges ... but the more crypto-cogniscenti
will know.)
My essential point is that it appears that you are trying
to overload a minor formatting feature with a high level
signature meaning and purpose distinction?
Yes, sure, this could be done, but it's not the right
place for it, I would have thought. Let's map out the
meaning of this signature first, and then think about
a) whether it is useful, and b) how to do it.
--
iang