On Fri, 26 Oct 2018 15:42, paul(_at_)fluidkeys(_dot_)com said:
If a key has multiple valid encryption subkeys, it's advertising that
it's OK to pick *any* of those subkeys. That's pretty arbitrary. I don't
see why picking *all* would be any worse than picking an arbitrary one.
Because they might not be intended for encryption of mail or the keys
are offline etc. Further if you use wildcards extra encryption subkeys
are extra annoying.
does but a more selective approach. OTOH, I am not sure whether one can
find a threat model where such a scheme would be useful.
Not sure I understand what you mean about threat model here?
A threat model which can be mitigated by having different private
subkeys on each device. The problem is that you want to read the mails
on every device and thus the sender needs to encrypt it to all subkeys.
The compromise of a single device and its subkey will anyway compromise
all your mails encrypted to that set of subkeys. Thus my conclusion is
copying the private key onto all device is much easier.
Shalom-Salam,
Werner
--
Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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