On 5 Jan 2009, at 04:57, der Mouse wrote:
What I, as an amateur, take away from it is approximately "MD5 is
showing more and more cracks and nobody should use it for anything
needs to withstand a malicious adversary".
Within the CA world, many folks here seem to agree.
However, the usage in CAs is rather different from
some other modes of operation (e.g. Keyed-Hash, HMAC-Hash).
So far, there are no known attacks on those other modes of operation.
[If someone knows of a refereed paper that's been published
on those latter topics, please share a citation here.]
These may be the best openly published breaks of MD5 at the moment,
Mind, there are published "serious attacks" [using NIST's words
from their web site] against SHA-0 and SHA-1 also. Timothy
Miller seemed to suggest in recent email that perhaps the PKIX WG
might enhance the CA structure to increase attack resistance in an
Now, may I suggest that folks please LOOK AT and possibly
REDUCE/EDIT the CC line as they reply to this thread going forward.
Items that are PKIX specific likely belong only on the PKIX
list. Ditto for SMIME specific issues to the SMIME list.
That would leave only generic comments for the SAAG list.