Dean Anderson wrote:
On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be.
Correct, and I gave an explanation for this in inforamtion theory.
What information theory says is that the probability of detecting
spam is less than 100%. This has nothing to do with what or what not
the IETF can do to prevent spam. This result is useful only for
an end-user, to feel good about his spam filter not being 100%
effective. This is a user result, not an IETF goal.
What interests the IETF are technical spam solutions, for example,
that would prevent email that comes from unidentifiable or rogue
senders/MTAs to be ever received. Not because spam is detected as
such but because untrusted, unidentifiable or rogue senders/MTAs
are detected. Yeah, this would still leave room for trusted and
identifiable senders/MTAs to send spam messages. But such spammers
are no longer a hidden target. And it would be a lot harder for
someone to send spam on behalf of you.
These are examples of feasible technical, IETF-relevant solutions to
spam, not at all denied by information theory. To implement these
solutions, we need an Internet design where we recognize that the
end points have become much less trusted than the connection. This
is the opposite of what the DARPA Internet assumed and was designed
for. So, some things gotta change.
For example, saying that you're "god(_at_)heaven(_dot_)org" should not be so
easy to do when you're sending email, even though it should still
be easy to set "god(_at_)heaven(_dot_)org" as your address in your MUA.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck