I'm also slightly surprised by this perspective (a distinct MoU). I had
though that the process we were following was that this IASA BCP would be a
document that was formally accepted by both the IETF (through the BCP
publication process) and by ISOC (possibly through a formal resolution of
adoption by the Board of Trustees).
I think that is the process we are following, and it seems like an
appropriate process for a document that describes "normal operating
procedures" for the IASA. As Rob said, the IASA BCP seems to implicitly
assume that we trust ISOC, and I have no problem with that given the
ground that the document currently covers.
However, the IASA BCP doesn't seem to be focussed on "off design"
conditions, such as those that are likely to cause (or result from) a
For example, we might like to prescribe binding arbitration to avoid
spending time in court, or describe the circumstances under which
the IETF can demand an audit, or define the ownership of IPR and/or
funds if and when a separation occurs. These are the kind of things which
might have to stand up in a court of law, so I'm not clear that a BCP
agreed upon by the IETF community and handed to ISOC will fit the bill.
I should also note that the current IASA BCP is quite vague about how the
ISOC is to assist the IASA in reaching the desired level of working
capital. One could interpret this as being purely an IASA operating
decision (e.g. if you want more working capital, raise the meeting fees to
obtain it). However, from the discussion, I gather that at least some
participants have something else in mind -- a sort of "ISOC dowry"
provided upon conclusion of the arrangement. This seems like something
that both parties need to be clear about, and agree to.
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