--On Thursday, 13 January, 2005 13:27 +0100 Harald Tveit
Alvestrand <harald(_at_)alvestrand(_dot_)no> wrote:
I think that should be enough - the IAD and IAOC can route all
frivolous requests to /dev/null; the decision of the IESG to
not ask the IAOC for a review is an IESG action that can be
handled in the usual way; there is no formal "I can overturn
your decision" involved; if the IAOC shows a pattern of
replying "go away" when a review is requested, that becomes a
matter of public record, and can be used at nomcom time.
Does this seem like a reasonable point on the various scales
I think this is reasonable, but want to flag three issues, none
of which impacts this particular section of the document.
Others have identified these, or at least pieces of them, so...
I think this is acceptable given that we *also* have a recall
procedure. In other words, if the IAOC isn't responsive
to a clear message from a review that "you screwed up", then
we'd better make sure that a recall is initiated.
And the traditional IETF recall procedure is probably not right
for this case, perhaps for one of the reasons it has never been
used in the IETF. The recall procedure requires parsing the
advocates and opponents of a decision (or screw-up more
generally), figuring out who is specifically to blame, and then
trying to remove him or her in a context that also requires
balancing past and potential future good deeds and speculation
about whether a replacement would be better against the
continuation of the person involved. The parsing process, and
maybe the rest, may be nearly impossible in a body we have
directed to work by consensus and that doesn't record votes or
internal informal discussions.
The same parsing process, of course, applies to "tell it to the
Nomcom" only without the benefits of public discussion of the
source of the dissatisfaction.
So the comments I've made have deliberately been of the nature
of "replace them", i.e., "fire the IAOC" rather than "recall an
individual". If the IAOC is going to work as a body and make
consensus decisions, then they are collectively responsible for
And I think the document probably needs some sort of "fire the
IAOC" procedure that would take out everyone except the three
(?) ex-officio people.
and the messy
situation where the looser in a bid wants the bid award
overturned so would be happier with some language that says
that its real hard or impossible to overturn signed contracts
I think the protection here is that there is no mechanism for
anyone saying "you are commanded to reverse that decision" to
the IAOC. Put differently, structures that prevent
micromanagement, including IESG/ IAB/ IETF Plenary intervention
to change individual IAOC decisions, are much better protection
against attempts to overturn signed contracts than any
specialized language in the BCP.
Absent really strong cause, I'd expect the IAOC response to a
review request about an already-signed contract, if they agreed
with the requestor after doing the review, would be "you are
right, we shouldn't have done that, will keep it in mind for the
future". If the IAOC starts moving in the direction of
overturning signed contracts in the absence of serious problems
and when there were any alternatives, that would, to me, be
cause for asking for a review and, if necessary, firing them
(see above) for general fiscal irresponsibility and stupidity.
If the IAOC is willing to try to overturn a signed contract
without very significant cause, then we have the wrong people on
the IAOC and should replace them.
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