I fail to see your point here.
Anyone can deploy DKIM, there is nothing unfair about the DKIM architecture.
The 'unfairness' that you appear to be complaining about is that DKIM solves a
problem that only targets a relatively small number of Internet domains,
although the effects of that attack are seen by everyone.
Impersonation of a trusted brand is always going to assit a social engineering
attack if this is possible. I do not understand the ideological calculus under
which we should do nothing to protect consumers against attacks of this nature
because we can't all have a trusted brand.
From: Keith Moore [mailto:moore(_at_)cs(_dot_)utk(_dot_)edu]
Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2007 3:39 PM
To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
Cc: Fred Baker; ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: Spammers answering TMDA Queries
Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
Absolutely, and in fact I see mailing list management as a natural
early adopter for DKIM filtering.
the problem I have with DKIM filtering is that it is only
effective for domains that can reasonably insist that all of
the mail originated by
users at that domain go through that domain's submission
is a corner case, not the general case. sure the spammers will learn
to not use DKIM domains, but they'll just move to other
domains, and the vast majority of domains won't be able to
use DKIM without seriously impairing their users' ability to
send mail. of course, some of the large ISPs and MSPs like
it that way.
frankly I don't think IETF should have backed a proposal that
was so unfairly biased toward a particular business model.
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