At Sun, 4 Jan 2009 07:51:01 -0500,
Marshall Eubanks wrote:
I think that Hank raises a very good question. There has been
a very active discussion of this on NANOG, both re SSL, BGP and in
general.
Here is the original link :
<http://hackaday.com/2008/12/30/25c3-hackers-completely-break-ssl-using-200-ps3s/
>
Regards
Marshall
Begin forwarded message:
From: Hank Nussbacher <hank(_at_)efes(_dot_)iucc(_dot_)ac(_dot_)il>
Date: January 4, 2009 2:22:06 AM EST
To: Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike(_at_)swm(_dot_)pp(_dot_)se>,
"nanog(_at_)nanog(_dot_)org" <nanog(_at_)nanog(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: Security team successfully cracks SSL using 200 PS3's
and MD5 flaw.
At 06:44 PM 03-01-09 +0100, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
On Sat, 3 Jan 2009, Hank Nussbacher wrote:
You mean like for BGP neighbors? Wanna suggest an alternative? :-)
Well, most likely MD5 is better than the alterantive today which is
to run no authentication/encryption at all.
But we should push whoever is developing these standards to go for
SHA-1 or equivalent instead of MD5 in the longer term.
Who is working on this? I don't find anything here:
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/idr-charter.html
All I can find is:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2385.txt
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3562.txt
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4278.txt
Nothing on replacing MD5 for BGP.
Oh boy...
1. This isn't a break in SSL per se. It's an attack on a single
CA which was still unsafely using MD5. As I understand it, they
have now fixed that. So, it's not clear to what extent this has
an ongoing impact. In particular, it only affects certificate-based
authentication, not authentication with a shared secret, as is
used in TCP-MD5.
My summary of the attack can be found
here:
http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2008/12/understanding_the_sotirov_et_a.html
2. The MAC used in TCP-MD5 is weak by modern standards (for several
reasons, not just that it uses MD5) and there is already work going
on in TCPM to replace it. See draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt.
-Ekr
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