Carl,
It is clear that we disagree.
The key points are the following:
1) CAs issue self-signed certificates.
2) CAs do NOT place constraints on the usage of theirs self-signed certificates.
These usages are placed OUTSIDE the self-signed certificates by Relying Parties.
The current draft with its current extensions does not allow to manage at the
same time
self-signed certificates and usage conditions for leaf certificates.
In the case of the Web browser model, it would be necessary to add conditions
which apply to the leaf certificate only, namely:
a) EKU, and
b) OIDs of Certification Policies.
In the more general case, it would be advantageous to also add an "application
class"
so that applications can know which self-signed certificates associated with
usages
that apply to leaf certificates are adequate for them.
Denis
----- Message reçu -----
De : Carl Wallace
À : denis.pinkas,ietf
Date : 2010-01-29, 14:12:32
Sujet : RE: [pkix] Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-tamp (TrustAnchor
ManagementProtocol(TAMP)) toProposed Standard
Though we?ve been through each of these points before responses are inline?
From: pkix-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
[mailto:pkix-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 3:19 AM
To: ietf
Cc: pkix
Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-tamp (TrustAnchor
ManagementProtocol(TAMP)) to Proposed Standard
Carl,
You said: "the current protocol is able to accommodate the web browser model
and
does so for the existing path processing constraints defined in RFC 5280, i.e.,
name constraints, certificate policies and certificate policy constraints".
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Applying "name constraints, certificate
policies
and certificate policy constraints" as defined in RFC 5280 is not sufficient to
accommodate
the web browser model.
The web browser model controls characteristics which only apply to leaf
certificates,
in practice EKU (Extended Key Usages) and OIDs of Certication Policies.
[CW] Certificate policies and policy constraints are fully supported.
EKU is not processed across a certification path so its utility in a TA is
limited.
[DP] EKU should be processed for the leaf certificate.
Independent of TAMP/TAF, the EKU-like mechanism used by some browsers
has been the subject of mailing list posts describing interoperability
problems.
This could be addressed by defining and using a similar extension that has
associated path processing rules. It has also been suggested that the
certificate policies
extension could serve this purpose without defining a new extension.
TAMP is not the place to sort out that issue.
[DP] If TAMP is not the place to slove this issue, then it means that TAMP
should go on the EXPERIMENTAL track.
You claim that this feature could be provided as an extension to the protocol.
[CW] I claim this, have given pointers to similar extensions and have offered
to co-author
or review the new specification.
This is an acknowledgment that the current document does not currently support
the web browser model.
[CW] The use of an EKU extension in a TA is not a different model. It?s a
different extension that fits
within the model that has been defined.
The current draft is in fact covering three use cases, none of them is
correctly addressing the web browser model.
Should an extension be defined, it would be difficult to use, since extensions,
as supported in the draft,
mandate to use two separate operations: to set the initial content of a trust
anchor and then to modify it
afwterwards using a TAMPUpdate operation (which is solely able to use
extensions).
[CW] This is not correct. A trust anchor can be added to a trust anchor store
with a full definition (including extensions)
using an add operation. There is no need for a second message simply to set
extensions.
[DP]The current definition ofa TrustAnchorChoice allows to add a structure that
is inappropriate
since it does not allow to support the missing features indicated at the top of
this e-mail or
to add the missing feaures in a single operation.
The initial content of a Trust Anchor is defined by:
TrustAnchorChoice ::= CHOICE {
certificate Certificate,
tbsCert [1] EXPLICIT TBSCertificate,
taInfo [2] EXPLICIT TrustAnchorInfo }
None of these options, include an extension field.
[CW] All of these options include an extensions field:
Certificate.tbsCertificate.extensions, TBSCertificate.extensions,
TrustAnchorInfo.exts.
[DP]The extension field of Certificate cannot be used. See the main comment at
the top of this e-mail.
Only the TAMP update operation includes an extension field:
TBSCertificateChangeInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
signature [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
issuer [1] Name OPTIONAL,
validity [2] Validity OPTIONAL,
subject [3] Name OPTIONAL,
subjectPublicKeyInfo [4] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
exts [5] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
Using a change function to add information is not the right way to proceed.
The protocol is unable to support the sending of a full description of a trust
anchor,
including the support of extensions, all in a single exchange.
[CW] The protocol fully supports the sending a full description of a trust
anchor, including the support of extensions,
all in a single exchange. You reference the change operation above. Look at
the add operation.
[DP] I did look at it. The problem is the same.
As said in the PKIX list, this can be done in a single step. Proposals have
been posted to demonstrate how it could be done.
It has been responded that the proposal was correctly adressing the issue in
principle, but the editors were not willing
to make a change which was considered as a major change to the initial proposal.
Another major issue for this draft is that it is unable to tell for which usage
(e.g. for which application or which purpose)
each trust anchor may be used.
[CW] A variety of extensions can be included to indicate the intended usage of
a trust anchor so it?s easy to look
at a trust anchor and find this information.
All these issues led me to propose that this document proceeds on the
EXPERIMENTAL track,
thus leaving room for a STANDARD protocol adressing the needs of the Internet
community
when using X.509 self-signed certificates associated with metadata.
Denis
De : pkix-bounces
À : denis.pinkas,ietf
Date : 2010-01-25, 16:20:06
Sujet : Re: [pkix] Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-tamp (Trust Anchor
ManagementProtocol(TAMP)) to Proposed Standard
Denis,
As we have discussed on the PKIX mailing list, the current protocol is able to
accommodate the web browser model and does so for the existing path processing
constraints defined in RFC 5280, i.e., name constraints, certificate policies
and certificate policy constraints. The problem you are referring to is really
with the current EKU extension, which is not processed across a certification
path. Were one to define an EKU variant that has path processing semantics,
TAMP would convey this information just fine. Other specifications have
defined extensions for inclusion in trust anchors to extend the RFC 5280 set,
including RFC 3779 and CCC. Something similar is appropriate for this purpose.
Carl
From: pkix-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
[mailto:pkix-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: Monday, January 25, 2010 3:49 AM
To: ietf
Cc: pkix
Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-tamp (Trust Anchor
ManagementProtocol (TAMP)) to Proposed Standard
The current protocol has severe limitations.
They have been pointed during the last call at the PKIX WG level, but the
protocol
has not been modified to address them.The end result has only been to add text
to explain the limitations without removing these limitations.
See section 3: "When using these structures without any additional extension,
for which purposes the trust anchor info shall be used to verify
certification paths needs to be locally defined; this means that different
usages for the same or different trust anchors placed in the same TAS
are not possible either.
One way to have different usages for different trust anchors without
using extensions is to use a different TAS for every different usage".
The consequences are as follows:
All web browser providers currently use a different model to manage trust
anchors.
They are able to associate different key usages for every leaf certificate
with any trust anchor (all placed in the same trust anchor store). This can be
done
in a single operation.
Furthermore, with the introduction of EV SSL Certificates
(i.e. Extended Validation SSL certificates) the Certification Policy OIDs of
leaf certificates that fulfills the requirements of EV SL certificates
are added to the trust anchor to which the EV SSL certificate relates.
This means that supporting the web browser model mandates to be able to add
key usages (e.g. EKU extended key usages) for leaf certificates
as well as Certification Policies for leaf certificates.
This is not possible with the proposed protocol.
As a consequence, the current protocol is unable to accomodate the web browser
model.
Since the protocol seems to be sufficient for another community
(but not to the Internet community), it is proposed to place this document
on the EXPERIMENTAL track rather than on the standards track.
Denis
Date : 2010-01-14, 18:34:14
Sujet : [pkix] Last Call: draft-ietf-pkix-tamp (Trust Anchor Management
Protocol (TAMP)) toProposed Standard
The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
(X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
- 'Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP) '
<draft-ietf-pkix-tamp-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard
This document includes a downref to draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, which
is under consideration by the IESG for publication as an Informational RFC.
This document updates ASN.1 modules for PKIX specifications to conform to
the 2002 version of ASN.1, but makes no changes to the bits on the wire.
The community is specifically requested to consider whether down refs
to draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1 are appropriate in the general case,
in addition to the specific case of draft-ietf-pkix-tamp.
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org mailing lists by 2010-01-28. Exceptionally,
comments may be sent to iesg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org instead. In either case,
please
retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-tamp-05.txt
IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=17760&rfc_flag=0
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