Re: Last Call: <draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02.txt> (Pervasive Monitori

Hi,

> > Knives are easily available to anyone, just like encryption.
> ...and just like pervasive monitoring?
That's a very good thought.

Yes, I believe encrpytion and the ability to pervasively monitor are
both easily available to everyone.

The next step after availability is actual usage, and this is where
things get interesting.

I believe that where encryption is not actually *used*, pervasice
monitoring *will* happen. Or, to state it a bit more in a logic-oriented
way:

Either the use of encryption proliferates, or the use of pervasive
monitoring proliferates.

It is a strict XOR: you can't have both, and you can't have none of the two.

Thinking more in the mathematic direction, I'd even say: it's an XOR in
the fuzzy logic sense: the truth value of the sum of both statements
equals 1; i.e. the more you sacrifice on one side, the more will creep
in on the other side.

As a corollary: if we don't want to enable perpass attakcs, we have to
make sure encryption gets *used* wherever possible.

For the general internet use, this probably means: since a vast majority
of internet users don't know and don't care about security, and will
accept whatever is the default unless it's inconvenient - our job is to
make encryption the default, and make it as convenient as possible. The
convenience may come at the expense of "perfect" security at times; but
it's a WG job to weigh that appropriately.

Greetings,

Stefan Winter

> In both, the product has already proliferated, and it is not possible to
> roll back to a state where it hasn't.
>
> Also, both of those have proven to have both too numerous and
> unquantifiable good and bad uses, and both of it in scale; there is no
> obvious, generally-accepted world-wide agreement that either of the two
> can only be used for nefarious purposes.
>
> So, I feel good comparing knives with pervasive monitoring.
>
> http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/12/09/tech-giants-band-together-for-nsa-reform/
> the irony of corporations that are profiting from pervasive monitoring -
> that's how Facebook and Google work - complaining
> about government pervasive monitoring is not lost on me.
>
> What I don't feel good about is perpass-attack, which is going to
> be at best ignored, or wildly misinterpreted and misused by its intended
> audience. It's primarily a kneejerk reaction to news events to assuage
> the consciences of IETF insiders.
>
> also, do we get drafts through last call by simply now announcing in
> the draft that it has been through last call? That does make things
> easier. Must start writing 'this RFC' in drafts, which will help that
> benighted state come to pass.
>
> Lloyd Wood
> http://sat-net.com/L.Wood/

-- 
Stefan WINTER
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