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RE: [Asrg] [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect Online Messages

2003-07-07 14:18:37
Point taken.

At 02:12 PM 7/7/2003 -0700, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:

The following are the message properties:

   Encrypted: No
   Signed: Yes
   Contents Altered after signing: No
   Signature Algorithm: SHA1

I finally got full net access (was on the RIM earlier)

This does look like a legit firm, it is identity based cryptography.

However it is unlikely to affect us since our problem is authentication
and not encryption. In an encryption scheme you have to know the
recipient's email before you send a message, hence the need for identity
based cryptography or a directory.

To authenticate you can send a certificate inband, so the problem that
is being solved is not really relevant to us.

                Phill

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Yakov Shafranovich [mailto:research(_at_)solidmatrix(_dot_)com]
> Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 3:46 PM
> To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip; 'gep2(_at_)terabites(_dot_)com'; 
'asrg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org'
> Subject: Re: [Asrg] [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to
> Protect Online
> Me ssages
>
>
> The original NY Times article has this relevant quote from
> Bruce Schneier:
>
> "A second challenge will be that in an increasingly online world,
> public-key systems have become far easier to use, said Bruce
> Schneier, a
> cryptography expert who is founder and chief technical officer of
> Counterpane Internet Security. "Nowadays its easy to look up
> a key," he
> said. "That has been solved by ubiquitous Internet access."
>
> At 12:03 PM 7/7/2003 -0700, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>
>
> >This sounds like it is an identity based encryption scheme
> although it could
> >also be snakeoil.
> >
> >You can think of this as a scheme where someones public key
> is a simple
> >function of their email address. This means that there is no need for
> >directory infrastructure etc.
> >
> >The drawback is that to make the scheme work you have to
> have a way of
> >distributing peoples private keys from a central issuer.
> There is no way to
> >revoke public keys either.
> >
> >Most people seem to want to generate their own keypairs and
> never reveal the
> >private key. In practice running a directory infrastructure
> is not a real
> >problem. Running x500 is a problem, but dns srv records
> pointing to an xkms
> >server would work fine.
> >
> >
> >
> >  -----Original Message-----
> >From:   Yakov Shafranovich
> >Sent:   Mon Jul 07 11:44:05 2003
> >To:     gep2(_at_)terabites(_dot_)com; asrg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
> >Subject:        Re: [Asrg] [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key
> to Protect
> >Online Messages
> >
> >Its described in detail at:
> >
> >http://crypto.stanford.edu/ibe/
> >
> >At 12:26 PM 7/7/2003 0500, gep2(_at_)terabites(_dot_)com wrote:
> >
> > >I thought this was interesting... any implications for us here?
> > >
> > >One obvious issue is how this handles things like mailing lists and
> > >digests and
> > >such which group messages from many different original
> senders, and where
> > >each
> > >original sender has no idea of the E-mail address of the ultimate
> >destination
> > >recipients.  (Would it be sufficient for the list software
> to decode and
> > >re-encode messages being processed?  But then they'd need
> to re-encode
> > >separately for each digest recipient...)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > ><---- Begin Forwarded Message ---->
> > >Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2003 04:10:17 -0400
> > >Subject: [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect
> Online Messages
> > >From: Dave Farber <dave(_at_)farber(_dot_)net>
> > >To: ip <ip(_at_)v2(_dot_)listbox(_dot_)com>
> > >Reply-To: dave(_at_)farber(_dot_)net
> > >
> > >
> > >------ Forwarded Message
> > >From: "the terminal of Geoff Goodfellow" <geoff(_at_)iconia(_dot_)com>
> > >Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2003 09:46:24 +0200
> > >To: "Dave E-mail Pamphleteer Farber" 
<farber(_at_)cis(_dot_)upenn(_dot_)edu>
> > >Subject: A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect Online Messages
> > >
> > >A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect Online Messages
> > >
> > >By JOHN MARKOFF
> > >The New York Times
> > >
> > >PALO ALTO, Calif., July 6 - A Silicon Valley start-up
> company on Tuesday
> > >plans to unveil a new approach to sending secure
> electronic messages and
> > >protecting data, a simpler alternative to current
> encryption systems, which
> > >use long digital numbers, called public keys.
> > >
> > >The new company, Voltage Security, which is based here,
> instead uses
> >another
> > >unique identifier as the public key: the message recipient's e-mail
> >address.
> > >
> > >Under the Voltage system, the sender of a message uses
> software that
> > >converts the recipient's e-mail address into a number and
> then encrypts the
> > >message using a mathematical formula. The recipient can
> then use a similar
> > >formula in conjunction with a secret key to decode the
> message. The company
> > >says it would be almost impossible for an eavesdropper to
> use the formula.
> > >The software can be used with several existing PC e-mail programs.
> > >
> > >--snip--
> > >
> > >http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/07/technology/07CODE.html
> > >
> >
> >=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
> -=-=-=-=-
> > >geoff(_dot_)goodfellow(_at_)iconia(_dot_)com * Prague - CZ * telephone +420
> 603 706 558
> > >"success is getting what you want & happiness is wanting
> what you get"
> >
> >http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/01/biztech/articles/17
drop.html
> >http://www.livejournal.com/users/a2gsg/
> >
> >
> >
> >------ End of Forwarded Message
> >
> >-------------------------------------
> >Archives at:
http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
> >
> >
> ><----  End Forwarded Message  ---->
> >
> >Gordon Peterson                  http://personal.terabites.com/
> >1977-2002  Twenty-fifth anniversary year of Local Area Networking!
> >Support the Anti-SPAM Amendment!  Join at http://www.cauce.org/
> >12/19/98: Partisan Republicans scornfully ignore the voters they
>"represent".
> >12/09/00: the date the Republican Party took down democracy in
America.
> >
> >
> >
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