Brad Knowles <brad(_dot_)knowles(_at_)skynet(_dot_)be> wrote:
As I see it, one primary problem with this draft is that it
breaks the most common form of mailing lists -- aliases.
This was discussed earlier on the list. "outgoing" MX records mean
that some current network behaviours may change. Mailing lists may
still exist, but their implementations may change. Other than
deployment, I don't see this as much of a problem.
This draft also prevents people from being able to legitimately
transmit e-mail using domain names that they don't control, via other
servers. It is not at all unusual for me to go travelling somewhere
and want to continue to use my normal e-mail address, but use the
local mail relay services available from the provider I'm using at
the moment.
How does the recipient of that email establish a consent framework
for communication with you? How does he separate your traffic from
the "forged spam" traffic?
You would have no choice but to have SMTPAUTH or TLSSMTP
available for the official relays for your domain, and to be able to
guarantee that you can always get through to them using these
features,
How is this different than having you establish a consent framework
for communication?
I don't see this sort of solution being feasible. The legitimate
third-party relay problem is a tough one to solve.
How does the recipient distinguish "legitimate" third-party relays
from "illegitimate" ones?
Why is it the recipients problem to establish that legitimacy? What
work are you willing to do, to share the burden of establishing that
legitimacy?
I'm not opposed to legitimate third-party relaying. But it's my
perogative as a recipient to discard any email I choose. Unverifiable
third-party relaying is a large part of my spam, and costs me time and
money. "legitimate" third-party relayers who ask that I spend more
time and money to "legitimatize" their email for them look a whole
lot like spammers, from that perspective.
Alan DeKok.
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