When using CRI over SMTP, not CRI over MIME, this would equal to dealing
with a non-compliant SMTP server. As long as dealing with abnormal SMTP
servers is accounted in CRI, this would be fine. When dealing with CRI
over MIME, this does not make a difference aside from regular problems
with SMTP delivering messages over and over.
Yakov
Eric Dean wrote:
I still don't see how CRI will break. We send CRI headers...we don't
get a response...how is that broken?
-----Original Message-----
From: asrg-admin(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org [mailto:asrg-admin(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On
Behalf Of
Yakov
Shafranovich
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 8:48 AM
To: ASRG list
Subject: [Asrg] 5. Challenge/Response Internetworking - DNS wildcards
(was
7. BCP - Verisign: All Your Misspelling Are Belong To Us)
The message below has direct relevance to the CRI proposal,
specifically
the part about verifying the sender via SMTP. With wildcards enabled,
CRI via SMTP will break.
Yakov
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 7. BCP - Verisign: All Your Misspelling Are Belong To Us
Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 01:26:23 -0400
From: Yakov Shafranovich <research(_at_)solidmatrix(_dot_)com>
To: Brad Knowles <brad(_dot_)knowles(_at_)skynet(_dot_)be>
CC: IRTF ASRG <asrg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org>
References: <a06001a20bb8c10de2061(_at_)[10(_dot_)0(_dot_)1(_dot_)2]>
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT VERISIGN IS OPERATING AN SMTP SERVER AT THAT
ADDRESS. The SMTP server appears fake, take a look at the following
transaction:
----snip---
open 64.94.110.11 25
220 snubby1-wceast Snubby Mail Rejector Daemon v1.3 ready
blahblahbla
250 OK
blahblahbla
250 OK
blahblabhjla
550 User domain does not exist.
blahblbjhbj
250 OK
blajbjbjb
221 snubby1-wceast Snubby Mail Rejector Daemon v1.3 closing
transmission
channel
Connection to host lost.
----snip---
Brad Knowles wrote:
Folks,
This was just posted to the NANOG mailing list. There are
already
people who are working on hacking BIND to return NXDOMAIN for
wildcard
records in TLD zones, or perhaps for any reference to the specific
IP
address(es) they are using (so far, we only know about
64.94.110.11).
Meanwhile, many are already null-routing this IP address.
This affects us, because now anyone can send spam with an
address
like
"i(_at_)spam(_dot_)from(_dot_)verisign(_dot_)becausethisdomaindoesntreallyexist(_dot_)net",
and
yet still have that pass standard anti-spam checks like "Does this
domain really exist in the DNS"?
Another one for the service provider BCP, I think.
Anyway, the full message announcing this "enhancement" is:
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2003 19:24:29 -0400
From: Matt Larson <mlarson(_at_)verisign(_dot_)com>
To: nanog(_at_)nanog(_dot_)org
Subject: Change to .com/.net behavior
Today VeriSign is adding a wildcard A record to the .com and .net
zones. The wildcard record in the .net zone was activated from
10:45AM EDT to 13:30PM EDT. The wildcard record in the .com zone
is
being added now. We have prepared a white paper describing
VeriSign's
wildcard implementation, which is available here:
http://www.verisign.com/resources/gd/sitefinder/implementation.pdf
By way of background, over the course of last year, VeriSign has
been
engaged in various aspects of web navigation work and study. These
activities were prompted by analysis of the IAB's recommendations
regarding IDN navigation and discussions within the Council of
European National Top-Level Domain Registries (CENTR) prompted by
DNS
wildcard testing in the .biz and .us top-level domains.
Understanding
that some registries have already implemented wildcards and that
others may in the future, we believe that it would be helpful to
have
a set of guidelines for registries and would like to make them
publicly available for that purpose. Accordingly, we drafted a
white
paper describing guidelines for the use of DNS wildcards in
top-level
domain zones. This document, which may be of interest to the NANOG
community, is available here:
http://www.verisign.com/resources/gd/sitefinder/bestpractices.pdf
Matt
--
Matt Larson <mlarson(_at_)verisign(_dot_)com>
VeriSign Naming and Directory Services
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