Mark Foster <mark(_at_)foster(_dot_)cc> wrote:
I've been doing some research into the use of STARTTLS and certificate
verification. The possibility exists for overlaying a
PKI trust model onto the email infrastructure... not just S/MIME and
PGP/GPG, but securing the message relay transmissions (MTA to MTA).
A PKI trust model is very different than overlaying encryption on
top of SMTP.
By enabling STARTTLS on any given email server (most of them support
STARTTLS), the server must have an x509 certificate, which
is either self-signed or signed by a public (or private) certificate
authority.
Which are both trivial to get, and mean nothing.
By also configuring the mail servers to cough up the same
certificate when relaying (outbound), something approaching a
whitelist trust model can be achieved.
How? You don't say that. That's the important piece, and the only
one worth talking about.
3. The existing CAs do not fit easily into the role currently played
by the DNSBL folks. They would need to revoke certificates upon receiving
complaints from the community at large about abuse.
Then you're using certificates for something they were never
intended to be used for, and giving CA's additional responsibility and
authority.
I don't think any of those problems are insurmountable. I haven't seen
too many folks touting this as a possible solution going forward,
either.
That's because it's not very practical.
This whole scheme is equivalent to publishing the web of trust in
any other format, and doesn't require STARTTLS or certificates for it
to work.
Alan DeKok.
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