Re: [Asrg] My take on e-postage
2004-04-25 17:11:17
Have you read the taugh whitepaper? Some of the points it raises
apply to your sketched design.
No - do you have a link?
http://www.taugh.com/epostage.pdf - or at least that's where I found it
when I fetched it, and there's still something there now; I haven't
checked that it's the same, but have no reason to think it's not.
At least some of it's objections seem to hinge on stamps being
anonymous. Unlike e-coins, that need not be the case. As I mention
below, some problems are more easily solved with identified stamps.
I'm afraid the micropayment argument doesn't hold water, because you
can always pay for blocks of, say, a thousand stamps at a time, and
exactly how hard is it to keep track of one counter per paying
customer?
It's a lot more than that that the stamp vendor needs to keep track of.
The first thing that comes to mind is that recipients need a way to
check that a stamp hasn't already been used - and even if the sender
sends them in order, the recipients won't necessarily check them in
order.
Not necessary, if the stamp cryptographically includes both the sender
and recipient addresses. If the recipient doesn't recognise the
address the stamp was made for delivery to, it's invalid.
Furthermore, the money paid for stamps goes to the wrong place, ie,
not to the recipients. (Stamp vendors could in principle pay
recipients who get mail with their stamps. This involves creation
of _another_ micropayment infrastructure per stamp vendor.)
Good point. There's a way around this, though - how about the
recipient's stamp vendor collects a portion of the stamp's value from
the sender's stamp vendor, and credits it to the recipient's account?
Sounds superficially plausible, but what do you do for fraud
prevention (that is, how can each tell that the other is reporting
honest totals)? This gets an awful lot of regulatory entities
involved, especially when (say) one of them is in China and the other
is in Nigeria.
I don't have a strong solution to that. However, it should be a simple
matter to at least list the actual stamps being claimed, and check them
against stamps issued.
In the event of a dispute - for example, two vendors try to claim the
same stamp - we start wanting to prove which claiming vendor actually
has the stamp's addressed recipient as a customer.
One way of doing that, which should be cheap enough to deal with small
disputes, is to send a special stamp to the recipient and see which
vendor it comes back from. Since the revenue from the stamp belongs to
the recipient, it doesn't matter if he switched vendors in the
meantime. It also doesn't particularly matter if the test stamp never
comes back.
For wider disputes, when measurable amounts of money get involved, you
start bringing humans in to negotiate. At some point, you might need
to downgrade disputing vendors' reputation, or even start legal
proceedings. That last, however, is way beyond any reasonable
technical measures, and indicates (alleged) fraud on the order of
hundreds of thousands of stamps.
This ignores mailing lists and the like, however. [...]
Very true.
Another solution is to use a proof-of-work stamp,
There really is no such thing. Hashcash is not something that can be
attached to a message; it requires an interactive protocol. (There may
be some way to do proof-of-work in an open-loop form, but I haven't
seen it yet.)
Why is this? Is it because the validity threshold of the recipient
isn't a priori known to the sender? If so, then a variation on the
usual "delivery failed" mechanism (insufficient hashcash for delivery,
please send 30 bits) should handle it. If for some other reason,
please expand.
Recipients can whitelist the trustworthy [stamp vendors] and
blacklist the others - which is a much easier problem than the
present practice of blacklisting individual senders.
For a little while, until spammers start creating throwaway stamp
vendors, the way they create throwaway domains now.
Which is why I said whitelists as well as blacklists. It does mean
there will be some barrier to entry for new stamp vendors, but I don't
know if that will be a serious problem.
Still, it may be worth trying. Most of this - on both our parts - is,
fundamentally, speculation, at present. After all, none of this stops
people who mutually feel like it from continuing to use SMTP the way we
all have been so far.
Naturally. This is also why the proprietary systems being proposed by
certain large corporations may not succeed, however much money is
behind them.
--------------------------------------------------------------
from: Jonathan "Chromatix" Morton
mail: chromi(_at_)chromatix(_dot_)demon(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk
website: http://www.chromatix.uklinux.net/
tagline: The key to knowledge is not to rely on people to teach you it.
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