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Re: [Asrg] An "ideal" false positive (TMGRS take 2)

2010-02-15 03:14:21
On 15/Feb/10 01:23, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
On Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 06:59:09PM +0100, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
 >On Thu, Jan 28, 2010 at 07:04:42PM +0100, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
 >>  Alice reports as spam a message from Bob, either by mistake or out
 >>  of curiosity.
 >
 >But there is no way to know that Alice actually filed the report
 >or that Bob actually sent the message.

 Botted users and nonsensical users would result in disputes that
 will eventually reveal their true nature.

How, exactly?

Through human interaction. That's the only way the paradox can be "solved".

Keep in mind that botted users now constitute a significant fraction
of the Internet's total population (whether we're counting "users"
as "human beings" or "email accounts". [1])

Such a huge number would easily overwhelm any abuse team, unless the latter is equipped with tools that allow it to cope with that. The ability to aggregate reports cleverly has been mentioned as a useful requirement.

So if there was some strategic reason why having billions of email
accounts, whether "real" or "fake", would provide them with an advantage:
they could make that happen with minimal effort.

One advantage is break the system in such a way that it cannot be used to lock them out. Discredit good users, weaken deliverability of abuse reports, stun abuse teams, and more DoS-style attacks could be attempted for that sake. However, the advantage is not immediate: they'd be actually attacking single mailbox providers.

*Anything* that presumes that end-user systems actually belong to
the end-users who think they own them is going to be highly susceptible
to manipulation -- and more so every day, every week, every month
that goes by.  It's only a question of whether or not the enemy
will choose to trouble themselves doing so, and I think that
if it inconveniences them or cuts into their profits, they will.

Well, to carry that analysis thoroughly through, we must consider whether there is a real distinction between end-user and end-user system. They are both highly susceptible to manipulation. Ian has told appalling examples. Out of the email context, let me mention the current political trend in my country: the more they lie, the more they get elected --the way they whisper "so what", with an almost imperceptible head-shake, peeved by the talk-show presenter finally coming out with some evidence that they have been lying for most of the time that they have been blatantly and vehemently championing their own action.

Consider that we will use end-user systems for election polls, sooner or later. How would it make a difference whether end-users are so gullible to let their systems be compromised, rather than their brains? What we can do is to provide a means for /some/ people to get out of that mud. Which people and which systems, will be each mailbox provider's choice.
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