I have been listening to this discussion. As the area advisor for
this proposed working group, I have made a few changes to the
paragraph that has caused so much debate. The revised text is
largely based on the XMPP charter text posted by Tony
Hansen. However, we know that some changes are absolutely
necessary. Jim Fenton has given one example in the area of
canonicalization. While I expect each and every
non-backwards-compatible change to be discussed on the mail list, I
do not think that an RFC needs to include the rationale. Thus, I
have dropped the words that might be construed this way.
Here is the revised proposed charter text:
Domain Keys Identified Mail (dkim)
==================================
CHAIRS:
<TBD>
SECURITY AREA DIRECTORS:
Russ Housley <housley(_at_)vigilsec(_dot_)com>
Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf(_at_)mit(_dot_)edu>
SECURITY AREA ADVISOR:
Russ Housley <housley(_at_)vigilsec(_dot_)com>
MAILING LISTS:
General Discussion: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
To Subscribe: http://mipassoc.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
Archive: http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/
DESCRIPTION OF WORKING GROUP:
The Internet mail protocols and infrastructure allow mail sent from one
domain to purport to be from another. While there are sometimes
legitimate reasons for doing this, it has become a source of general
confusion, as well as a mechanism for fraud and for distribution of spam
(when done illegitimately, it's called "spoofing"). The DKIM working
group will produce standards-track specifications that allow a domain to
take responsibility, using digital signatures, for having taken part in
the transmission of an email message and to publish "policy" information
about how it applies those signatures. Taken together, these will assist
receiving domains in detecting (or ruling out) certain forms of spoofing
as it pertains to the signing domain.
The DKIM working group will produce a summary of the threats that are
addressed by the proposed standards-track specifications, while
acknowledging their limitations and scope. The DKIM working group will
also produce security requirements to guide their efforts, and will
analyze the impact on senders and receivers who are not using DKIM,
particularly any cases in which mail may be inappropriately labeled as
suspicious or spoofed.
While the techniques specified by the DKIM working group will not prevent
fraud or spam, they will provide a tool for defense against them by
assisting receiving domains in detecting some spoofing of known domains.
The standards-track specifications will not mandate any particular action
by the receiving domain when a signature fails to validate. That said,
with the understanding that guidance is necessary for implementors, the
DKIM documents should discuss a reasonable set of possible actions and
strategies, and analyze their likely effects on attacks and on normal
email delivery. The DKIM working group will not attempt to establish
requirements for trust relationships between domains nor to specify
reputation or accreditation systems.
The DKIM working group will consider mailing-list behaviour that is
currently deemed acceptable, will make every effort to allow such mailing
lists to continue to operate in a DKIM environment, and will provide a
plan for smooth transition of mailing lists that fail to operate. The
specifications will also advise mailing lists on how to take advantage of
DKIM if they should choose to do so.
The signatures will use public-key cryptography and will be based on
domain name identifiers. Public keys needed to validate the signatures
will be stored in the responsible identity's DNS hierarchy. The
specifications will be based on the following Internet Drafts:
* draft-fenton-dkim-threats
* draft-allman-dkim-base
* draft-allman-dkim-ssp
These documents represent experimentation and consensus from a number of
designers and early implementors.
Experimentation has resulted in Internet deployment of these
specifications. Although not encouraged, non-backwards-compatible changes
to these specifications will be acceptable if the DKIM working group
determines that the changes are required to meet the group's technical
objectives.
The resulting protocols must meet typical criteria for success. In
addition to security, these include usability, scalability, ease of
deployment, and cryptographic algorithm independence.
To prevent this task from becoming unwieldy, several related topics are
considered out of scope for the DKIM working group. These topics include:
* Reputation and accreditation systems. While we expect these to add
value to what is defined by the DKIM working group, their development
will be separate, and is out of scope for the DKIM working group.
* Message content encryption.
* Additional key management protocols or infrastructure.
* Signatures that are intended to make long-term assertions beyond the
expected transit time of a message from originator to recipient, which
is normally only a matter of a few days at most.
* Signatures that attempt to make strong assertions about the identity
of the message author, and details of user-level signing of messages
(as distinguished from domain-level keys that are restricted to
specific users).
* Duplication of prior work in signed email, including S/MIME and OpenPGP.
Once the primary goals are met, the DKIM working group may also study
whether to adopt a work item for specifying a common mechanism to
communicate the results of message verification to the message recipient.
The generation of a standards-track specification on this topic will
require an update to the DKIM working group charter.
The deliverables for the DKIM working group are these:
* An informational RFC presenting a detailed threat analysis of, and
security requirements for, DKIM. IESG approval of this document is
a prerequisite for the submission of the standards-track
specifications.
* A standards-track specification for DKIM signature and verification.
* A standards-track specification for DKIM policy handling.
* A standards-track specification for DKIM DNS Resource Record(s).
* An informational RFC providing an overview of DKIM and how it can
fit into overall messaging systems, implementation and migration
considerations, and outlining potential DKIM applications and
future extensions.
GOALS AND MILESTONES:
02/06 WG last call on DKIM threats and security requirements
05/06 WG last call on DKIM signature specification
09/06 WG last call on DKIM policy specification
12/06 WG last call on DKIM DNS Resource Record
12/06 WG last call on overview document
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