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Re: [ietf-dkim] Issue 1386 and downgrade attacks

2007-03-01 06:02:09
On Wed, 28 Feb 2007 18:00:03 -0000, Eric Allman <eric+dkim(_at_)sendmail(_dot_)org> wrote:


I'm tempted to say "well, duh." That's the reason why senders will probably want to support both A and B for a fairly long period. But there will always be some verifiers that do not upgrade, and at some point the signers are going to drop support for A, and that will create problems for verifiers who haven't upgraded.

If the transition is short, then I'll be concerned about it. But if the transition is multiple years and the verifiers still haven't upgraded I'm not going to lose any sleep over it. By the way, this is Assumption 2.

If a signer does go from SA to SB without passing through SAB (or not maintaining it long enough) then they will be hurting themselves,

So you are saying, and I think we all agree, that the period during which the signer implements SAB needs to be at least O(Months) but not O(Years).

But O(Months) is still quite a long time, and provides a sufficient window of opportunity for a spammer to mount this attack.

since (Assumption 5, from my previous mail to Charles, saying that verifiers actually implement the spec as written) their mail will be treated like any unsigned message --- which in the long run means "poorly".

What verifiers actually implement will in the Real World (TM) be what their customers pay them to implement.

If they let through too much spam/phish/whatever, their customers will go elsewhere.

If they fail to let through too many genuine messages, their customers will go elsewhere.

Here we have an exploit that works against a verifier that tries to help his customers by letting through mails that are most likely genuine. A fairly simple cure for this exploit has been suggested (extra information in the SSP, though other cures might work as well).

So why not let that cure go into the SSP (or any other adequate cure), and move on to next business. The cure is not expensive; it improves security; so why not implement it?

--
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------
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