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[ietf-dkim] SSP-02 the problem with Author Signature

2008-02-18 16:38:44
Per RFC 4871:

The signature's i= parameter is "expected" to contain on-behalf-of  
information:

----
i=  Identity of the user or agent (e.g., a mailing list manager) on  
behalf of which this message is signed...
...
INFORMATIVE DISCUSSION: This document does not require the value of  
the "i=" tag to match the identity in any message header fields.

This definition is fairly useful since it allows signing domains to  
provide a reporting token within the i= parameter for verifiers to use  
to identify the agent creating a problem.  This token can be obscured  
and be a transient hash of the account used to access their outbound  
servers, for example.


SSP-02:

2.8. Author Signature

  An "Author Signature" is any Valid Signature where the identity of
  the user or agent on behalf of which the message is signed (listed in
  the "i=" tag or its default value from the "d=" tag) matches an
  Author Address (From header email-address) in the message.

3.3. SSP Record Syntax

"all" All mail from the domain is signed with an Author Signature.


Translation:

Only signatures on-behalf-of the From header email-address are  
considered compliant with an "all" SSP policy.  This is in conflict  
with RFC 4871.  Not all signatures are on-behalf-of the entity  
represented by the From header, of course.  Essentially, this  
necessitates the i= parameter not be used when the identity might  
conflict with the identity contained within the From header.  The i=  
parameter, as the only parameter defined as providing a higher  
granularity of the message sources, will no longer be useful in these  
cases.  How does this help verifiers cope with abuse?  It doesn't.

Per RFC 4871, a signature is valid when the signed on-behalf-of  
identity, the i= parameter, does not relate to the From header email- 
address.   However, the SSP-02 definition prevents the i= parameters  
from being useful in this role.  As a result, in many cases, this  
parameter is now unable to identify the actual agent or user who  
introduced the message when using an obscured hash of the identity the  
agent when it is related to the Resent-From or Sender header.

-Doug

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