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Re: [ietf-dkim] NEW ISSUE: SSP-02: Policy Scope

2008-02-20 11:35:30

On Feb 20, 2008, at 3:41 AM, Charles Lindsey wrote:

On Fri, 15 Feb 2008 19:27:29 -0000, Douglas Otis <dotis(_at_)mail- 
abuse.org>
wrote:

On Feb 15, 2008, at 4:50 AM, Charles Lindsey wrote:

On Thu, 14 Feb 2008 19:08:41 -0000, Douglas Otis 
<dotis(_at_)mail-abuse(_dot_)org 

wrote:

s= Policy Scope (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "SMTP").  A  
colon-

No! The default must be '*'.

The concern regarding defaults was addressed in Take #3.  This  
version includes a means to exclude policy.

And indeed Take #3 starts:

s= Policy Scope (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "*").

so it seems my point is accepted.

   *  matches against all unlisted transport protocols
   !  disavows protocol use
   -  excludes protocol from policy assertions

I suspect the default should be "s=SMTP" where this would be the  
same as "s=SMTP:-*".  When the domain exchanges no communication  
whatsoever, "s=!*" could be used.  When only SMTP messages are  
used, then "s=SMTP:!*" would make this assertion.

But now you are contradicting yourself. First you say 'default is  
"*"';
now you are saying 'I suspect the default should be "s=SMTP"'. Which  
is it?

The policy assertion of "s=*", this would mean that other protocols  
might be affected the publisher did not expect.  Rather than  
potentially blocking other protocols, an assertion of "s=SMTP", as a  
default, would require publishers to proactively make explicit  
restrictions on other protocols.  From the comments on this list, it  
seems most view the policy record as being related to messages  
entering the SMTP related infrastructure.   In that respect, the SMTP  
policy would be applied anyway.  Having this policy record impact  
fully independent and separate message transports seems as though it  
should be explicit.  Having an explicit policy will also allow the  
verifier to better trust that this restriction was the intent of the  
policy.  Trust in assertion is important.

But you have to make it clear that verifiers can only discern the  
protocol used by the originating site by carefull examination of  
Received headers (and believable ones at that). So I am still very  
dubious about adding this feature.

Trace headers can not be included within DKIM signatures.

Then in that case the whole idea of a protocol parameter in SSP  
falls flat on its face. Because there is no other method, apart from  
Received headers, for telling what was the original protocol used in  
sending the message, and we all know how easy Received headers are  
to spoof.

Type of transport is always implied.  Messages handled primarily by  
SMTP transport, you would be absolutely right, SMTP is the only  
assumption that should be made.  DKIM can also be used by independent  
and separate message transports protocols that are completely  
unrelated to SMTP.  In that case, the transport is also implied, but  
it would not be SMTP.

So we are back to what Hector is saying. SSP MUST be applicable to  
any message in RFC 2822 format, or any format similar to that (which  
clearly includes News). Because other formats are regularly gated  
_into_ SMTP (often with the removal of headers such as Newsgroups  
and Path which might have indicated their origin). So sites that  
publish strict/discardable/whatever policies will just have to be  
careful.

If this view prevails, then the *SP should be defined as being  
applicable to SMTP related messages, which includes any other  
protocols that might be delivered to the same location as those  
carried over SMTP.

-Doug

-


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