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Re: [ietf-dkim] Final update to 4871bis for working group review

2011-07-07 09:07:06
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Alessandro 
Vesely
Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2011 4:56 AM
To: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Final update to 4871bis for working group review

I'd s/to be liberal/to be exceedingly liberal/ (we don't want to
revise Postel's statement, do we?)

You're either liberal in your application of the RFCs, or you're not.  I don't 
see how adding that word improves things here.

   DKIM signs and validates the data it is told to and works correctly.
   So in this case, DKIM has done its job of delivering a validated
   domain (the "d=" value) and, given the semantics of a DKIM signature,
   essentially the signer has taken some responsibility for a
   problematic message.  It is up to the identity assessor or some other
   subsequent agent to act on such messages as needed, such as degrading
   the trust of the message (or, indeed, of the signer), or by warning
   the recipient, or even refusing delivery.

I'd omit any allegation on what an assessor's needed actions might be.

"Such as" makes it clear these are only possible actions (and the obvious 
ones).  It's not an exhaustive list.

 (Actually, we'd need yet another policy or authentication method in
order to allow the outcome of an identity assessor to be formally
expressed.  Without it, the quick-n-dirty approach of degrading the
trust of a message by tampering with its DKIM verification's results
may seem the easiest remedy --much like what Doug et al. proposed.)

If the role of the identity assessor is reputation, and we decide later that we 
want reputation to be relayed to downstream agents, we can extend RFC5451 by 
such a registration then.  It doesn't make sense to do it here though.

   An agent consuming DKIM results needs to be aware that the validity
   of any header field, signed or otherwise, is not guaranteed by DKIM.

Please, s/validity/reliability/: someone might believe a field is
valid if it retains the value that was given to it originally.

Isn't that conclusion precisely what this sentence is countering?

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