"Hallam-Baker," == Hallam-Baker, Phillip <pbaker(_at_)verisign(_dot_)com>
writes:
>> [mailto:owner-ietf-mailsig(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of
Sam
>> Hartman
>> >>>>> "Douglas" == Douglas Otis <dotis(_at_)mail-abuse(_dot_)org> writes:
>>
>> Brief summary: we disagree a lot.
Douglas> This mechanism is the only means to make the validation
Douglas> of the local-part explicit. It may not be reasonable, if
Douglas> this causes a proliferation of user-keys beyond normal
Douglas> capacity.
>> That's unclear to me. I'm not sure whether current domainkey
>> semantics say that the local part is validated. If they do
>> not, allowing a policy attribute to be attached to a signature
>> saying that the local part is validated seems sufficient to
>> address your concern.
Hallam-Baker,> If you think about it I think you will agree that
Hallam-Baker,> the policy attribute has to be attached to the
Hallam-Baker,> key. The signature can weaken the policy statement
Hallam-Baker,> and say that the signature meets a lower criteria
Hallam-Baker,> but should not raise the criteria.
I was thinking that for a per-domain key--a key allowed to sign any
local part--the signature itself could indicate whether the local part
was in fact checked.
I agree that a signature must not promote the authorization of a key.