On Mon, 1 Aug 2005, Douglas Otis wrote:
[...] message signatures offer _no_ authenticated identifier prior to
resources being committed. [...] acting upon a bad signature's history
by refusing service against the domain name comes too late to preserve
resources.
This is off-topic because it's about optimizing rejections and reputation
lookups, rather than the basic authenticaion mechanism.
What's the problem with doing the reputation lookup before verifying the
signature? If the rep is bad enough to reject the message then it doesn't
matter whether the sig is good or bad. The sig (and therefore the rep
lokup key) occurs early enough in the data that no disk resources need to
be committed, and the RAM required is pretty small.
Tony.
--
f.a.n.finch <dot(_at_)dotat(_dot_)at> http://dotat.at/
BISCAY: WEST 5 OR 6 BECOMING VARIABLE 3 OR 4. SHOWERS AT FIRST. MODERATE OR
GOOD.