Dean Anderson wrote:
On Mon, 10 Jan 2005 Matthew(_dot_)van(_dot_)Eerde(_at_)hbinc(_dot_)com wrote:
I think you're forgeting that _every_ user (including every spammer
and forger, and virus-infected computer) has relay services provided
by their provider. They have those services right up until they don't.
SPF takes for granted that the ISP's users can forge email to the ISPs
relay, and doesn't address that problem. This opens the possibility
for 100% blowback.
True. Consider Sammy Spammer using Example ISP. They could send email all day
long from innocentbystander(_at_)isp(_dot_)example(_dot_)com, and if I reject
the email on the grounds of being malware, isp.example.com's mail server is
going to deluge innocentbystander(_at_)isp(_dot_)example(_dot_)com with lots of
blowback.
But surely innocentbystander(_at_)isp(_dot_)example(_dot_)com can report this
to Example ISP, who should have the necessary logs to be able to catch Sammy
Spammer, or at least terminate their access.
You may reject some virii. But I think you don't reject all virii
Right, I can't catch all virii. But I can reject the ones I do catch.
Matthew.van.Eerde (at) hbinc.com 805.964.4554 x902
Hispanic Business Inc./HireDiversity.com Software Engineer
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