ietf-openpgp
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Re: Klima/Rosa attack (was: Re: Diffs for next draft)

2001-08-24 09:48:19

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Edwin Woudt wrote:

Jon Callas <jon(_at_)callas(_dot_)org> replied:

I think an S2K that includes a hash is only mildly hackish, myself. I'd
support this. I'd even support an additional one that is merely salted
with a hash.


I disagree. As Werner Koch already pointed out, the 'correct' solution is 
to introduce version 5 of the secret key packet. I however do not think 
that there is any real reason for introducing a v5 public key packet, given 
that nothing changed for public key packets.

Keeping v4 public key packets will make sure nothing is broken with regard 
to exchanging public keys. Exchanging secret keys with older 
implementations will be broken in both cases anyway, because of the new s2k 
type.

Edwin

v5 seckey packet will broke seckey exchange with older versions,
while new s2k not - it will still be possible to import seckey in older ver
with aged workaround - unprotect them, export, import into older ver, protect 
again.

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