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David Shaw noted this PGP (and now GnuPG) behavior:
If the designated revoker's key is not present, then a key "revoked"
by the designated revoker key is not treated as revoked. GnuPG - as
of this morning - does it the same way.
I would argue that silently ignoring a missing revoker is a bad default.
GnuPG is generally very good about issuing warnings (and offering
options :-). Would you be willing to do so here (at least when
a potential revocation is present)?
I know this doesn't thwart would-be attackers. They can always
remove the revocation itself. A warning would simply help
recognize that the key is effectively incomplete, and that the
revoker should be retrieved. (Or, have you adjusted GnuPG to
automatically retrieve revokers after retrieving a key from a server?)
A signed CRL could provide the means to defeat removal attacks. I
thought that I'd seen a draft that had considered some form of CRL,
but I can't find it now. Did that ever come up? I understand that
this requires a bunch of specification, so I can see why it might have
been rejected.
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