On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 04:45:31PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
On Mon, 19 Sep 2005 09:01:37 -0400, David Shaw said:
So at least from the graceful failure perspective in GnuPG, it doesn't
really matter much which way we go. I prefer the first option (using
the current algorithm number) since it seems cleanest in both code and
However this does also means that another hash algorithm needs to be a
MUST algorithm - unless we limit the MUST support for DSA to 1024 bits
keys.
The need for another algorithm makes a big difference for emdedded
applications. Ofen the threat model does not require
high budget spook proof algorithms.
I fully agree with that. I would limit the MUST support to plain old SHA1
and 1024bit DSA for the time being.
--
Daniel