ietf-openpgp
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Re: Fix revocation keys instead of fingerprints? (was Re: Non-SHA-1 fingerprints)

2009-05-07 12:37:40

On May 5, 2009, at 2:13 AM, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:

Hi,

David Shaw wrote:
It's a larger problem than just fingerprints. We also use a fingerprint as a specifier inside the revocation key subpacket, to designate which
key can be used to issue revocations on our behalf.  The thing is,
though, a fingerprint isn't really a very good revocation key specifier:

Fingerprints:
* Must be human-readable
* Needs to be small to be useful
* Can collide to some small amount (4880 even documents that they
collide in section 12.2)

That's not the fingerprint. That's the key ID.

A nit, but that really is the fingerprint.

12.2:

Note that there is a much smaller, but still non-zero, probability that two different keys have the same fingerprint.

It's not exactly *likely*, but it's not quite zero. I heard a urban- legendish story once about someone who (completely accidentally) generated a key that just happened to have a fingerprint collision with someone else's key. Unfortunately, thinking it was a bug, they deleted the key... make of that what you will :)

David