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Re: [openpgp] Fingerprints and their collisions resistance

2013-01-04 14:55:27
On 01/03/2013 10:25 PM, ianG wrote:
Hence my earlier question - has anyone allocated the OpenPGP numbers for
Keccak as yet?  The reason I asked is because I stumbled on the code
last week and thought what a fine idea it would be to at least prepare
the way....  Strawman?

   SHA3-224         4        12
   SHA3-256         5        13
   SHA3-384         6        14
   SHA3-512         7        15

Strawman?  I'm not sure why there is a gap 4-7 in rfc4880.  Are there
any spots already allocated?

One point I wanted bring up here based on the draft that I wrote last year is that let's think for a moment about the usefulness of the SHA3-224.

I would like to see an argument for it. Algorithms like DSA/ECDSA are capable to deal with hash truncation or padding. RSA mod has sufficient space to always use SHA3-512.

The question is especially relevant if you familiarize yourself with the Keccak. Keccak is basically a single hash algorithm which output is truncated to 256, 384, 512, etc bits. The only difference between SHA3-256 and SHA3-512, for example, is one integer used in the internal loop.

You can always go with stronger security. Who are those people who would not be OK with SHA3-256 but are happy with SHA3-224 ? Why can't they use shorter public keys (to solve space concerns?) ?
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