On 4/11/2015 1:37 am, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
Bryan Ford proposed getting rid of all unencrypted meta-data. In
particular, he wanted to get rid of the recipients / number of
recipients.
There are some practical difficulties with this approach,
which I mentioned above.
My proposal is a blue sky idea to avoid having to try to decrypt a
message with every secret key while (hopefully) making it more
difficult to get at the list of recipients.
While I don't doubt the good intentions, I fail to see how this has
any real value. Specifically because of the significantly larger
amounts of meta-data which already leaks from every SMTP exchange
ever. That's the real threat and that inevitably leads to this
question:
* In what scenario has someone gone to the effort of disguising all
their SMTP traffic (remailers, tor, whatever), but not selected an
alias on the OpenPGP key they're using?
Regards,
Ben
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________
openpgp mailing list
openpgp(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp