On Mar 29, 2019, at 7:17 PM, Bart Butler
<bartbutler=40protonmail(_dot_)com(_at_)dmarc(_dot_)ietf(_dot_)org> wrote:
Hi Jon,
As others have noted, there is a lot of confusion on this thread, some of
which you touched in your AEAD Conundrum message, like when we say AEAD
should not release unauthenticated plaintext, do we mean the entire message
or the chunk?
That is precisely the question. But the bigger question is whether you care
about that. Sometimes it matters, sometimes it does not.
For example, let’s suppose that I have a very large blob on mass storage. Media
failures happen. If there’s a bad block on a disk, do you want to lose the
whole file because of it? Sometimes you want to throw your hands up in the air.
This is most common in an interactive protocol, and in general the answer is
yes. For example, an SSL connection to a server, if there’s funny business
going on, you want to blow up the connection and try over again. On the other
hand, if you had an archival thing (e.g. tar file with some historic
documents), you want to recover as much as you can.
OpenPGP is in general the latter case rather than the former. I believe it’s
less important to have strict semantics on failures because it’s usually
storage.
Another piece of confusion is that Efail isn't a single vulnerability, it was
several vulnerabilities related (at best) thematically.
I understand Efail. Trust me.
So to be very specific, for the purpose of the following discussion, the
advantage of smaller AEAD chunks is specifically to prevent Efail-style
ciphertext malleability/gadget attacks, and the prohibition on releasing
unauthenticated plaintext is applied to individual chunks, which is
sufficient to foil this kind of attack in email.
I disagree. If you want to prevent something like Efail, you want larger
chunks. Assuming that you believe that early release matters.
Let’s rewind here, and not talk about Efail, let’s talk about the real issue.
If you want the entire blob to have all-or-nothing semantics, then you want the
fewest number of chunks as is reasonable. If you have attacker-controlled
inputs, then every joint between the chunks is a vulnerability.
The kind of attack we are talking about is fundamentally about exfiltration
of plaintext data to an attacker-controlled endpoint. Borrowing from your
AEAD Conundrum message, if the first chunk passes and is released, and the
second chunk fails, that is OK, at least for email, because the part that was
modified (the second chunk) is never released, so you get a truncated message
and an error, but the truncated message without the modifications isn't going
to exfiltrate itself.
I agree with this.
Now if releasing ANY authenticated chunk of a message that hasn't been fully
authenticated (in an AEAD sense) is a real problem for your application, I'd
argue that you're trying to make AEAD do something it's not suited for and
you should enforce this in your application if it applies to you, probably by
not streaming.
So to recap, small-chunk AEAD provides specific value in preventing
ciphertext malleability/gadget attacks, particularly in HTML email, which is
a common use case.
Also agree 100%.
This is why a long time ago, I said that Efail is orthogonal to the chunking
issue. Either way, large or small, you end up in the same place of not being
hacked.
What value does large-chunk AEAD actually provide? What I'm getting from the
AEAD Conundrum message is that it's a way for the message encrypter to
leverage the "don't release unauthenticated chunks" prohibition to force the
decrypter to decrypt the whole message before releasing anything. Why do we
want to give the message creator this kind of power? Why should the message
creator be given the choice to force her recipient to either decrypt the
entire message before release or be less safe than she would have been with
smaller chunks?
Let me summarize the conundrum: If you want strict AEAD no-release semantics,
you want a fewer number of chunks.
Coming back to Neal's point, it's really hard to see any sort of value in
really large AEAD chunks, because the performance overhead is negligible at
that point and the only security 'benefit' that I can see is the encrypter
trying to use the spec to force the decrypter to not stream, which does not
seem like something at all desirable.
Okay, here’s another thing that’s a pet peeve of mine. We’re arguing security
and you brought up performance. I never mentioned performance, the people who
want large chunks haven’t brought it up. They want large chunks because they
perceive it to be more secure.
If you respond to a security request with a performance answer, you literally
don’t know what you’re talking about. So let’s toss that aside.
Bigger chunks *are* more secure. Does that security matter? Well, it does to
the people who want big chunks.
-Bart
P.S. ProtonMail doesn't use V5 keys or the new draft yet, but some users of
OpenPGP.js have started using them with 256kB chunks, so we are not arguing
on behalf of ourselves for the 256kB chunk size. The proposed language seems
more or less OK in this regard, as most implementations will presumably keep
256kB support so these early adopters will not lose interoperability with
their messages.
I am going to rewind again, back to the proposal I made. Here it is, so we can
look at it.
* MUST support 16KB chunks.
* SHOULD support 256K chunks, as these are common (Protonmail).
* MAY support larger up to the present very large size.
* MAY reject or error out on chunks larger than 16KB, but repeating ourselves,
SHOULD support 256K.
Elided out of this, and possibly important is that “support” includes chunks
smaller than that size. I should have said that, but I wanted it to be as stark
as possible. So let me repeat it and abstract it with some variables:
(1) MUST support up to <small-chunk-size> chunks.
(2) SHOULD support up to <larger-chunk-size> chunks, as these are common.
(3) MAY support larger up to the present very large size.
(4) MAY reject or error out on chunks larger than <small-chunk-size>, but
repeating ourselves, SHOULD support <larger-chunk-size>.
Clauses (3) and (4) set up a sandbox for the people who want very large chunks.
They can do whatever they want, and the rest of us can ignore them. Why get rid
of that? It doesn’t add any complexity to the code. It lets the people who want
the huge ones do them in their own environment and not bother other people.
My concern is over (1) and (2) and specifically that there’s both <small> and
<large> sizes.
I think that’s an issue. If there are two numbers we are apt to end up with
skew before settling on one, so it’s better to agree on just one. That’s the
real wart in my proposal.
Neal said he’s fine with 256K. We could do that. 16K has also been suggested (I
think Neal said it’s his preference). My intuition is that whatever GnuPG is
using for partial body lengths is also a good option as we know that that’s
reasonable for both performance and everything else, and my preference is that
it be as small as possible to support the smallest footprint possible. I spent
about ten minutes looking for the answer and I think it’s 8K, but I’m not sure.
Someone correct me if that’s not it. Whatever it is, that’s what I’d do, but
I’m not an implementer.
Opinions on what a single number should be? 256? 16? 8? Something else?
Jon
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