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[openpgp] Discussion regarding signalling of preferences for multiple encryption-capable keys

2022-04-14 08:06:46
I cannot post to the Design Team list, so I post it on this mailing list:

Regarding the discussion around multiple encryption-capable subkeys, I would like to make the following remarks on behalf of the project PQC@Thunderbird. At IETF 113 we presented our ongoing project for the standardisation of PQC in OpenPGP. Well aware that this is not in the scope of the crypto refresh, we still want to make a comment on the signalling mechanism for a preferred usage of multiple encryption subkeys, as it is currently being discussed by the Design Team. The reason is that a related issue will in our view most likely also arise in the context of multi-algorithm encryption. What we refer to as multi-algorithm encryption is often also referred to as hybrid encryption and means the combined encryption with two public key encryption schemes in such a way, that the combined scheme is only broken when both constituent schemes are broken. "Both constituent schemes" will typically be a classical scheme and a PQC scheme. For such a combination of two public-key encryption operations, an algorithm for the derivation of the session key from the input-keys encrypted in each PKESK is also needed. Proposals for this exist and typically involve the use of a KDF.

So far to introduce the background. Now we come to the point were the signalling of the intended subkey usage matters in this approach: If a user wants to restrict others to only sending him encrypted messages using multi-algorithm encryption with two specific encryption subkeys from his keyring in combination – i.e. not allowing them to use either of the two keys in the default "single-algorithm" manner, the question arises * how to signal to the sender that a certain encryption subkey must only be used in a multi-algorithm combination with another (specific) subkey from the same keyring (e.g. to indicate: "use this PQC key only in multi-algorithm encryption together with ECDH")?

In our understanding this problem could be solved by a signalling mechanism analogous to the one discussed now regarding parallel encryption. The mechanism would have to be enhanced by a flag signalling the intended use of a key in the multi-algorithm context only.

We just want to provide this piece of information for the case it matters for the ongoing discussion in Design Team.

Best regards,
Falko

--

MTG AG
Dr. Falko Strenzke
Executive System Architect

Phone: +49 6151 8000-24
E-Mail: falko(_dot_)strenzke(_at_)mtg(_dot_)de
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