Re: CDT Comments on OPES

John Morris and I had a discussion on the CDT issues
on the www.stardust.com talkradio.

I certainly agree with this observation that the
POLICY should focus on "the problem space" (mis-using services)
not on any company or technology.

At 05:40 AM 8/19/2001, Tom Gray wrote:

> Since the Internet is full of proxy servers which
> control users access to services, I do not see why the
> OPES effort should be picked out. IP telephony is
> based on control and the proxy servers in SIP are
> designed to enforce adminstrative policy on access to
> servces among other things. Why is OPEs considered to
> be of such importance in this?
>
>
> --- John Morris <jmorris(_at_)cdt(_dot_)org> wrote:
> >
> > FYI, below are comments circulated a few days ago to
> > the IESG, providing a
> > public policy perspective on some of the issues
> > raised by the OPES working
> > group proposal.  Many of the issues discussed have
> > been discussed on this
> > list and/or the IETF list; some are addressed in the
> > current charter draft,
> > while others are not.  Whether or not the IETF
> > working group is
> > established, I am hopeful that these comments can
> > make a constructive
> > contribution to the discussion of the proposed OPES
> > tools.  John Morris
> >
> > ----------------------------------------
> > John B. Morris, Jr.
> > Director, Internet Standards, Technology
> > & Policy Project
> > Center for Democracy and Technology
> > 1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100
> > Washington, DC 20006
> > (202) 637-9800
> > (202) 637-0968 fax
> > jmorris(_at_)cdt(_dot_)org
> > http://www.cdt.org
> > ----------------------------------------
> >
> > 1.0 Summary
> >
> > We write to outline serious policy concerns raised
> > by the proposal that the
> > IETF/IESG create a working group on "Open Pluggable
> > Edge Services" (OPES).
> >
> > As outlined below, OPES would further diminish the
> > "end to end" principles
> > that have been so important to the development of
> > the Internet.  OPES would
> > reduce both the integrity, and the perception of
> > integrity, of
> > communications over the Internet, and would
> > significantly increase
> > uncertainly about what might have been done to
> > content as it moved through
> > the network.  OPES would also increase the risk that
> > ISPs can exercise
> > bottleneck control over users' access to the
> > Internet, and could favor
> > certain content and application providers over
> > others.
> >
> > On the threshold question of whether the IETF should
> > sponsor and sanction
> > the proposed OPES working group, we believe that the
> > risks of OPES outweigh
> > the benefits of IETF review and control.  In the
> > event that the IESG
> > approves the creation of the OPES working group, we
> > suggest below a set of
> > requirements for OPES that would mitigate policy
> > concerns.
> >
> > 2.0 Background
> >
> > The Center for Democracy and Technology first became
> > aware of the OPES
> > proposals through the work of its newly created
> > Internet Standards,
> > Technology & Policy Project [see
> > http://www.cdt.org/standards/]. (The
> > comments below are submitted on behalf of CDT, and
> > not the Project
> > participants.) CDT is a nonprofit public interest
> > group that promotes civil
> > liberties and democratic values online. CDT has over
> > the years been very
> > involved in protecting free speech, privacy, and
> > openness on the Internet,
> > and these comments reflect those public policy
> > goals.
> >
> >
> > 3.0 Concerns Raised by OPES
> >
> > 3.1 Content Manipulation, Free Expression, and
> > Privacy
> >
> > OPES would significantly increase the risk of
> > unauthorized interference
> > with or manipulation of communications as they
> > traverse the Internet.  OPES
> > would diminish end to end network design principles
> > and facilitate
> > third-party alteration of, or action based on,
> > communications without the
> > notice or consent of end point parties. As such it
> > creates major concerns
> > for free expression and privacy online.
> >
> > The one party consent model defined in the proposed
> > charter poses a threat
> > to the model of trust built into the end to end
> > model, as well as allowing
> > third parties to interfere with the free flow of
> > information that has
> > become a hallmark of Internet communication. For
> > example, OPES could
> > facilitate third-party or state-sponsored censorship
> > of Internet content
> > without the knowledge or consent of end users; OPES
> > could also facilitate
> > third-party manipulation of content for commercial
> > purposes (such as
> > advertising) without the consent of the end parties.
> >  OPES could also
> > facilitate surveillance systems like Carnivore,
> > risking individual privacy
> > and discouraging unpopular expression on the web.
> > Those who wish to
> > publish content with complete integrity may be
> > forced to use end-to-end
> > encryption of communications, raising barriers to
> > entry in the cost of
> > publishing and decreasing potential benefits of
> > caching.
> >
> > Undeniably, as proposed, OPES would require the
> > consent of either the
> > sender or receiver.  Also undeniably, the IETF
> > process would likely ensure
> > that this and other security and privacy concerns
> > would be honored in a
> > proper implementation of OPES.
> >
> > At bottom, however, OPES is not a protocol for
> > communications between
> > computers or networks, but rather is a
> > self-contained facility to
> > manipulate content.  The core functions of OPES
> > (rule-based review of
> > content, diversion of selected content, and
> > execution of proxylets or other
> > content manipulations) can be implemented entirely
> > within one server (or
> > linked servers).  There is no fundamental need that
> > certain protections and
> > guidelines be followed to, for example, ensure
> > interoperability among
> > networks.  It appears unlikely that meaningful
> > security and validation
> > requirements could be made to be so integral to OPES
> > that such requirements
> > could not be easily overridden within an individual
> > implementation of OPES.
> >
> > The wide proliferation of OPES implementations
> > would, it seems, be likely
> > to lead to the modification of such implementations
> > to facilitate
> > unauthorized manipulations of content.  The
> > incentives for unauthorized
> > manipulations are clearly present on the Internet,
> > and OPES would make such
> > improper actions easier to implement.  Just very
> > recently we have seen
> > examples of largely unauthorized manipulation of
> > content for marketing
> > purposes by third parties.  [See, e.g.,
> > http://slashdot.org/features/01/07/31/2015216.shtml
> > or
> >
> http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/08/02/parasite_capital/index.ht
> >
> > ml].  OPES seems likely to facilitate such schemes.
> >
> > 3.2  Facilitating Gatekeepers
> >
> > OPES could further promote the creation of
> > bottleneck power in the hands of
> > Internet Service Providers.  Over the past few
> > years, the Internet has seen
> > broadband ISPs move toward a business model of
> > contracting with "preferred"
> > content providers and facilitating the fast delivery
> > of that content over
> > competing, non-preferred content. OPES would
> > significantly increase the
> > potential of ISPs to enter into preferential or even
> > exclusive contracts
> > with service providers ("the exclusive language
> > translation services
> > offered to users of XYZ ISP").  These preferred and
> > exclusive arrangements
> > can serve to reduce innovation and competition for
> > content and services on
> > the Internet.  Although high bandwidth content is
> > already subject to
> > potential discrimination in delivery over some ISPs,
> > OPES would likely
> > increase such potential for discrimination among
> > service
> === message truncated ===
>
>
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Michael W. Condry
Director,  Network Edge Technology