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Re: Extensibility discussion

1998-12-08 09:03:29
John:

If you read the document carefully, you will see that each *RecipientInfo structure has a different version number in it.  I would not like to see an OID followed by an ANY structure here.  It will simply increase the liklihood on non-interoperability.  In fact, the MSG spec would have to profile out its use.

What key management technique is not supported by the alternative provided?

Russ


At 09:00 AM 12/8/98 -0800, John Ross wrote:
Russ
 
OK,
but what about extending the choice, are you also opposed to that?
 
Regards
 
JR
-----Original Message-----
From: Russ Housley <housley(_at_)spyrus(_dot_)com>
To: John Ross <ross(_at_)jgross(_dot_)demon(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk>
Cc: ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org <ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org>
Date: Monday, December 07, 1998 8:36 PM
Subject: Re: Extensibility discussion

John:

One bucket for unprotected attributes in the EnvelopedData structure is more than enough.  If we put two such buckets (by adding a second one to keyAgreeRecipientInfo), then the processing gets complex.

I am strongly opposed.

Russ


At 03:12 PM 12/3/98 -0800, John Ross wrote:
--Cut--

 The following is an example ASN.1:

 RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
        ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo,
        kari [1] KeyAgreeRecipientInfo,
        kekri [2] KEKRecipientInfo
        kext [3] ExternalyDefinedKeyAgreement --for future or private key management schemes }


ExternalyDefinedKeyAgreement :: = OCTET STRING


Alternatively,  the syntax of the externally defined key management use the OID extension mechanism:

ExternalyDefinedKeyAgreement :: = SEQUENCE {
   ExternalID  OBJECT IDENTIFIER {
   ExternalValue ANY DEFINED BY  ExternalID 
}


I slightly favor the OID extension but if there is objection to that extension mechanism, the OCTET STRING approach would be adequate.


John Ross