At 9:13 AM -0400 6/28/01, Housley, Russ wrote:
As many of you know, I am arguing for a common set of cryptographic
algorithms throughout the IETF Security Area. Having each CMS
referee specify their own set of algorithms does not support this
What do others think?
Russ is right on a technical front: the IETF should use a common set.
It is now looking better that this might happen, given that the TLS
folks are going to use RSA with OEAP for AES ciphers.
On a political front, this is going to be a long battle. The IETF
security area takes forever to act on things that they have agreed
to; for instance, IPsec still mandates DES (not TripleDES) years
after our self-congratulatory pronouncements about changing. There is
very little cross-pollination in the security area, as shown by the
It is worth a shot, but don't expect success.
--Paul Hoffman, Director
--Internet Mail Consortium