ietf-smime
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RE: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-multisig-03

2007-12-13 23:48:04

Denis,

1.  We are going to change the reference, I thought you had already been
copied on such a message.

2.  I cannot accept this language as I don't believe one will be able to
tell when the problem is straightforward and when it is not.  I think that
we need to be more conservative that your proposed language is.

Jim

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org [mailto:owner-ietf-
smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2007 1:09 AM
To: ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-multisig-03


Jim,

1 - What would you propose to solve comment 1 ?

2 - For comment 2, I would propose the following text instead:

If two different one-way functions used in different signed attributes
exhibit collisions, finding a message where a collision may be found at
the same time for each one way function may not be straightforward. So,
if both one-way functions are cracked, verifying two linked signerInfo
structures at the same time may still provide some level of confidence.

Denis

Denis,

See below.


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org [mailto:owner-ietf-
smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2007 5:45 AM
To: ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-smime-multisig-03





This message initiates an SMIME Working Group Last Call on the


document:



Title     : Multiple Signatures in S/MIME
Author(s) : S. Turner and J. Schaad
Filename  : draft-ietf-smime-multisig-03.txt
Pages     : 19
Date      : 2007-11-16


I have two minor comments:

1 - On page 5, the last line refers to section 4.3. However, it is
unclear why.

2 - In the security considerations section, the third paragraph
states:

  This attribute provides no protection if all of the algorithms
used
  in the signer attribute are 'cracked'.

This is not always true. If two different one way functions exhibit
collisions,
finding a message where a collision may be found *at the same time*
for each one way function may not be straightforward.



I agree this is true.  How about the wording:

This attribute cannot be relied upon in the event that all of the
algorithms
used in the signer attribute are 'cracked'.  It is not possible for a
verifier to determine that a collision could not be found that
satisfies all
of the algorithms.

Jim



Denis



CMS SignedData includes the SignerInfo structure to convey per-
signer
information. SignedData supports multiple signers and multiple


signature


algorithms per-signer with multiple SignerInfo structures. If a
signer
attaches more than one SignerInfo, there are concerns that an
attacker


could


perform a downgrade attack by removing the SignerInfo(s) with the


'strong'


algorithm(s). This document defines the multiple-signatures
attribute,


its


generation rules, and its processing rules to allow signers to
convey
multiple SignerInfo while protecting against downgrade attacks.
Additionally, this attribute may assist during periods of algorithm
migration.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-multisig-03.txt

The purpose of this WG Last Call is to ensure that the Working Group


has


achieved consensus that the document is suitable for publication as
a
Standards Track RFC.

Please review the document for both technical and editorial
problems.
Technical issues should be discussed on this list. Editorial issues


may be


sent to the document editor.

The Last Call period will end on 9 Janurary 2008.

Upon completion of the last call, the WG chairs will take action
based


upon


the consensus of the WG. Possible actions include:

  1) recommending to the IETF Security Area Directors
     that the document, after possible editorial or
     other minor changes, be considered by the IESG
     for publication as an Informational RFC
     (which generally involves an IETF-wide Last Call); or

  2) requiring that outstanding issues be adequately
     addressed prior to further action (including,
     possibly, another WG Last Call).

Remember that it is our responsibility as Working Group members to


ensure


the quality of our documents and of the Internet Standards process.


So,


please read and comment!

Blake
--
Blake Ramsdell | Sendmail, Inc. | http://www.sendmail.com