ietf-smime
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Re: Using Signature Policy in RFC-5126

2008-07-03 08:44:47

Yasir,

this specific point has caused many interoperability issues. Not only is the concatenation method subject to interpretation, but also, if you have several archive timestamps, you have to use heuristics to guess the previous encoding of the attribute sequence because it can be in BER.

I can give you my humble interpretation of the way to concatenate but I cannot promise it will be the same as everyone else.

There are currently discussions regarding a change of this attribute, possibly mandating DER encoding to remove all ambiguities. Do you believe such a change would be worthwhile ?

Regards,

--
Julien Stern


Yasir Khan wrote:
RFC 5126 explains how to create archived time stamp i.e.

ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

   The value of the messageImprint field within TimeStampToken shall be

   a hash of the concatenation of:

      - the encapContentInfo element of the SignedData sequence;

      - any external content being protected by the signature, if the

        eContent element of the encapContentInfo is omitted;

      - the Certificates and crls elements of the SignedData sequence,

        when present, and;

      - all data elements in the SignerInfo sequence including all

        signed and unsigned attributes.

The ArchiveTimeStamp will be added as an unsigned attribute in the SignerInfo sequence.

According to the RFC, it is clear that message imprint will be the hash of above concatenated values but it is not explained how to concatenate these values? Please clarify this point. Some hint for implementing this would be highly appreciated. Thanks!

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**YASIR KHAN***
*Development Manager****

**Ascertia Limited**
www.ascertia.com <http://www.ascertia.com/>
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*From:* owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] *On Behalf Of *Pavel V. Smirnov
*Sent:* Thursday, June 26, 2008 1:04 PM
*To:* 'Yasir Khan'; ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
*Subject:* RE: Using Signature Policy in RFC-5126

Yes, I mean “digital signature policy” as a “policy document” present at SPUri. But I use SPUri only for example, you may specify a SigPolicyId and omit sigPolicyQualifiers at all. In this case you have to rely on some other means to convey a correspondence between SigPolicyIds and “policy documents”.

In case of SPuri you have to retrieve a “policy document” by its URI and hash it.

Note that if your infrastructure provides a trusted source of “policy documents”, and there will never be two different (versions of) “policy documents” identified by the same OID, you don’t have to hash them at all. Just use zero policy hash value.

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
e-mail: spv(_at_)CryptoPro(_dot_)ru <mailto:spv(_at_)CryptoPro(_dot_)ru>

*From:* owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] *On Behalf Of *Yasir Khan
*Sent:* Thursday, June 26, 2008 12:19 PM
*To:* Смирнов Павел Владимирович; ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
*Subject:* RE: Using Signature Policy in RFC-5126

You wrote: ”You have to hash a *digital signature policy* represented as a sequence of bytes in some format and place the computed value in SigPolicyHash.”

To which item you are naming as “digital signature policy”. You mean policy document present at SPUri? If Yes then it makes some sense. But if only SPUserNotice is present or nothing is present as *sigPolicyQualifiers* as it is an OPTIONAL element:

sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL

then on which item the hash would be computed?

Regards,

Yasir Khan

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*From:* Pavel V. Smirnov [mailto:spv(_at_)cryptopro(_dot_)ru]
*Sent:* Wednesday, June 25, 2008 4:07 PM
*To:* 'Yasir Khan'; ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
*Subject:* RE: Using Signature Policy in RFC-5126

Hello Yasir,

There is no need to protect by SigPolicyHash other fields of SignaturePolicyId structure because it is placed in a signed attribute. All signed attributes are protected by the signature itself.

In most cases the policy would be an external document not included in your signed message, and you have to unambiguously indicate specific policy with respect to which your document should be treated. E.g., you may only have an URI pointing to the policy as a SigPolicyQualifier.

You have to hash a digital signature policy represented as a sequence of bytes in some format and place the computed value in SigPolicyHash.

Pavel Smirnov

Crypto-Pro
Tel./Fax: +7 495 780-4820
WWW: http://www.CryptoPro.ru <http://www.cryptopro.ru/>
e-mail: spv(_at_)CryptoPro(_dot_)ru <mailto:spv(_at_)CryptoPro(_dot_)ru>

*From:* owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org [mailto:owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] *On Behalf Of *Yasir Khan
*Sent:* Wednesday, June 25, 2008 2:43 PM
*To:* ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
*Subject:* Using Signature Policy in RFC-5126

We have a question related to using the signature policy in the CAdES signatures (EPES) defined in RFC-5126. Here is the relevant structure:

SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {

            sigPolicyIdentifier SigPolicyId,

            *sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,*

            sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF

            SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL

}

SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

*SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue*

* *

*OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {*

*            hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,*

*        hashValue       OtherHashValue *

*}*

SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {

            sigPolicyQualifierId SigPolicyQualifierId,

            sigQualifier ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId

}

SigPolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {

iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) id-spq(5) 1

}

SPuri ::= IA5String

id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {

iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) id-spq(5) 2

}

SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {

            noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,

            explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL

}

NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {

            organization DisplayText,

            noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER

}

DisplayText ::= CHOICE {

            visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),

            bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),

            utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200))

}

In the given structure for CAdES-EPES signature, its is not clear that whether are we computing the hash "SigPolicyHash" over the document at "SPuri" and/or over the "SPUserNotice"

Are the following combinations valid?

1) Only compute hash over document present at SPURI if only SPUri is set

2) Only compute hash over SPUserNotice  if only SPUserNotice is set

3) Compute hash over document at SPURI and SPUserNotice if both are set

Please clarify it. Thanks!

Regards,

Yasir Khan
Development Manager

Ascertia Ltd
40 Occam Road
Surrey Research Park
Guildford
Surrey, GU2 7YG
United Kingdom

t.  +44 (0)1483 685500
f.  +44 (0)1483 573704

www.ascertia.com <http://www.ascertia.com/>
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