On Fri, Jun 6, 2014 at 4:12 PM, Brandon Long <blong(_at_)google(_dot_)com>
Now that more servers are offering STARTTLS, it would seem beneficial to
move forward towards certificate validation.
How do people feel about bringing the concept of certificate pinning from
HTTP (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-13) to SMTP?
I realize there's also DANE TLSA (RFC 6698), but that has a requirement on
DNSSEC that may limit its deployment for some time to come.
translating the syntax in the http draft to smtp ehlo, I would imagine
something like (on a second EHLO after the TLS session is started):
C: EHLO foo
S: 250-SIZE 35882577
S: 250-PKP PIN-SHA256=d6qzRu9zOECb90Uez27xWltNsj0e1Md7GkYYkVoZWmM=
S: 250-PKP PIN-SHA256=LPJNul+wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ=
S: 250-PKP MAX-AGE=259200
S: 250 CHUNKING
What about bringing HSTS to SMTP as well?
S: 250-STSEC MAX-AGE=31536000
This would indicate that connections must use STARTTLS for future
connections. Ideally, this would allow a client to directly issue
STARTTLS on connect, rather than EHLO (a protocol violation today),
reducing the amount of unencrypted data on the connection and speeding
up the connection sequence.
ietf-smtp mailing list