On 4/25/2016 1:18 PM, Steve Atkins wrote:
The nasty bit is trusting someone you don't trust with your private key to
serve you the javascript code your crypto is executing on.
+1, and thanks for noting it.
In practical terms, if the mail operator is supplying the client code,
then the client's activity is wholly controlled by the operator. That
includes the operator knowing the user's private key.
But the general form of this is: whoever supplies the MUA -- or, more
precisely, the user's encryption-related software and process -- knows
the user's private key. Or at least, they can. So creafully vetting
that code and supplier is essential.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
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