At 02:09 PM 5/31/2002 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
So we seem to have only a few work items suggested so far:
I think the problem is that while there is (very) rough consensus
IETF-wide that there is a strong cultural bias against patent
encumberances (*), this bias is not adequately documented in writing.
1. Improve the language that indicates IETF community preferences
concerning when to accept or reject IPR components to a specification. Per
Ted's observation, the improved language needs to give better guidance to
new IETF participants and to other groups that work with the IETF. (The
rest of Ted's note suggested some nicely pragmatic goals/caveats for upper
and lower bounds to this goal.)
Ten years ago, we were mostly concerned with the "silent patent holder"
problem. ...
The current process was designed to minimize this risk, ...
As KRE points out, the whole mechanism falls apart when vendors field
products based on a proposed standard, not to mention an internet draft.
It seems unlikely that we can do much about this, for specifications that
have IPR announced after proposed standard has been reached.
2. When we know about IPR before going to Proposed, we could of course
require the "interoperability test" for IPR licensing beforehand.
The idea of requiring interoperability testing before going to Proposed is
already in the IETF repertoire for certain sensitive cases, so this would
be a pretty compatible change to the current model.
There are other issues. The first one is the imprecision of the
disclosure requirements.
3. Seems like this is a relatively minor tuning issue to the current
policy, followed by some careful legal language crafting. Yes?
A second issue is the interaction between the standardization process and
non-disclosure agreements. For example, an IETF participant may know that
his or her former employer has a patent claim on a technology considered
for standardization; in fact, I know case where the participant is in fact
one of the authors of the patent. Yet, the agreement signed when leaving
an employer typically prevents disclosure of such information. In another
example, a vendor may have to sign an NDA before learning that its product
infringes on some other organization's patent. This vendor is then legally
prevented to signal the existence of the patent claim to the IETF.
4. This is probably going to be the toughest of the set to
resolve. Perhaps we can treat some sorts of NDA-related issues as conflict
of interest, and invoke our current rules concerning them? Ultimately I
suspect we have little leverage here.
I would contend that, if we have one urgent problem to solve, it is to
find a way to ensure speedy disclosure of intellectual property issues
that affect a standard.
I have never heard anyone claim that we have more leverage over this than
we are already exerting.
d/
----------
Dave Crocker <mailto:dave(_at_)tribalwise(_dot_)com>
TribalWise, Inc. <http://www.tribalwise.com>
tel +1.408.246.8253; fax +1.408.850.1850
----------
Dave Crocker <mailto:dave(_at_)tribalwise(_dot_)com>
TribalWise, Inc. <http://www.tribalwise.com>
tel +1.408.246.8253; fax +1.408.850.1850