"Robert G. Brown" wrote:
a) All hosts must resolve with DNS.
If you list why this isn't used today perhaps you
will change "must" to "may".
b) All hosts must support an encryption key registered with DNS that
permits all message hops to occur between registered hosts encrypted
with the destination host public key.
Mail privacy can only be guaranteed with an end-to-end encryption.
Securing email in message hops does nothing to prevent monitoring
at each host in the hop -- with some hosts not even advertised in
the header.
c) The header autogenerate a postmaster-recursive email address for
reporting abuse to the entire delivery path. This would put a rather
large burden on the main network backbone administrators -- they'd need
automated tools to help handle it. OTOH, it would REALLY give them an
incentive to shut down networks that are a primary source of abuse until
they manage to police themselves.
This would create a huge liability for the backbone administrators --
for example, one false abuse report and they could be sued for disrupting
lawful communications. Human supervision actually increases the liability
-- it can't be blamed on a software glitch.
d) With keyed host registration, tools that can QUICKLY isolate an
originating host and bop its (ab)user (minimally get them off the
network, ideally "instantly" fine them or charge them money such as a
reconnection fee AFTER getting them off the network).
Machines running amok, quickly killing off other machines without
recourse, without explanation. A kangaroo court for email, penalizing
the users.
This would give
end users a strong incentive to police their own systems against viruses
and would give spammers additional costs to pay or additional charges to
be brought against them, should they try to skip out.
Again, what you propose is to penalize the victim -- the user. That's
exactly what we should stop doing.
I personally would ALSO like it if AV vendors STOPPED bounce messages
altogether.
Free speech, good luck.