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Re: [Hipsec] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-hip-dns (Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions) to Experimental RFC

2007-05-29 06:10:16
Hi Pekka,

I don't have answers to all of your questions/remarks, but I'd take forward a few:

1) what if HIP RRs are not queried first?

   In the following we assume that the initiator first queries for HIP
   resource records at the responder FQDN.

==> what if it does not?

Remember that this is an experimental spec. So, taking it the reverse, why should id specify what to do if someone has a reason to do it in another way?

I don't see any specific reason to make any MUSTs or even SHOULDs here: I don't see here any danger for the Internet nor interoperability. But maybe I just don't understand the dangers you have in your mind.

3) a premature optimization of HIT lookup tags

   Upon return of a HIP RR, a host MUST always calculate the HI-
   derivative HIT to be used in the HIP exchange, as specified in
   Section 3 of the HIP base specification [I-D.ietf-hip-base], while
   the HIT possibly embedded along SHOULD only be used as an
   optimization (e.g. table lookup).

.. and in section 8.2:

   [...] This is why a HIP
   end-node implementation SHOULD NOT authenticate its HIP peers based
   solely on a HIT retrieved from the DNS, but SHOULD rather use HI-
   based authentication.

==> this seems like a premature optimization.

Note that these RRs may need to be indexed also by other boxes but the end-nodes. For them, using the HIT as an index and doing a simple memory comparison instead of calculating a hash may be a win. Further note that both the sections you quote above discuss only host/ end-note behaviour.

If you go forward as it is, I think the spec needs to be more explicit on 1) what happens when HIT received from the DNS does not match the hash but the hash
is checked;

I agree. FWIW, either ignore the HIT or drop the record. I think the latter would be the right option, but I may be wrong.

2) what are the threats if HIT is used as-is without
hash-checking (as allowed by the spec at the moment) when a) the DNS-HIT points to something used by another HI, and b) the DNS-HIT doesn't exist.

I don't understand what you are saying here.

--Pekka (the other one)


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