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Re: tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-mip4-fmipv4-07.txt

2007-06-13 10:14:20


Hi Jari,

Below are the additions in the OLD/New format.

-Rajeev


On 6/8/07 3:46 PM, "Rajeev Koodli" <rajeev(_dot_)koodli(_at_)nokia(_dot_)com> 
wrote:

In Section 4.2 I believe you have to use RFC 2119 language for the
following text parts:
"
      "Home Address" field must be the PCoA (which can be either the
      Home Address or the co-located CoA)

      Home Agent field must be set to PAR's IP address

      Care-of Address field must be the NAR's IP address discovered via
      PrRtAdv message

      Destination IP address must be PAR's IP address

      Source IP address must be the PCoA (which can be either the Home
      Address or the co-located CoA)
"
and in 
"
When sent in this "reactive" mode, the Destination IP address must be
NAR's IP address;
"

Okay. Francis also noted this.


Section 4.2 (first paragraph)

OLD:

When sent in this "predictive" mode, the
fields in the FBU are used as follows:

      "Home Address" field must be the PCoA (which can be either the
      Home Address or the co-located CoA)

      Home Agent field must be set to PAR's IP address

      Care-of Address field must be the NAR's IP address discovered via
      PrRtAdv message

      Destination IP address must be PAR's IP address

      Source IP address must be the PCoA (which can be either the Home
      Address or the co-located CoA)


NEW:

When sent in this "predictive" mode, the
fields in the FBU MUST be used as follows:

      "Home Address" field is the PCoA (which can be either the
      Home Address or the co-located CoA)

      Home Agent field is set to PAR's IP address

      Care-of Address field is the NAR's IP address discovered via
      PrRtAdv message

      Destination IP address is the PAR's IP address

      Source IP address is the PCoA (which can be either the Home
      Address or the co-located CoA)


Section 4.2 (fourth paragraph, below Figure 1)

OLD:

" When sent in this "reactive" mode, the Destination IP address must be
NAR's IP address;.."

NEW:

"When sent in this "reactive" mode, the Destination IP address MUST be NAR's
IP address;.."

I am not sure what the purpose of Section 5 is. You refer to a long
expired draft but why does it matter. Can this section be deleted?


Purely informational. I am okay one way or the other.


OLD:

Section 5:

NEW:

Delete Section 5. 

Add 

"Sending FBU from the new link (i.e., reactive mode) is similar to
using the extension defined in [draft-mip4-ro]; however, this document also
addresses movement detection and router discovery latencies."

At the end of the Acknowledgment (Section 10).



You might want to replace "MUST NOT exceed 10 seconds." with
"The value in this field MUST NOT exceed 10 seconds." to have a complete
sentence. 

Ok.


Section 6.1

OLD:

Lifetime: The number of seconds remaining before binding
         expires.  MUST NOT exceed 10 seconds.

NEW:

Lifetime: The number of seconds remaining before binding
         expires.  This value MUST NOT exceed 10 seconds.



I think you want to recommend IPsec usage.


Ok, I can add that.


Section 8:

OLD:

The HI and HAck messages need to be secured using a pre-existing
   security association between the access routers to ensure at least
   message integrity and authentication, and should also include
   encryption.

NEW:

The HI and HAck messages need to be secured using a pre-existing
   security association between the access routers to ensure at least
   message integrity and authentication, and should also include
   encryption. IPsec ESP SHOULD be used.



In case of "Secure FBU, malicious or inadvertent redirection" isn't it
quite likely that an attack by a mobile node can be punished later since
the key management used to create the security association for the FBU
is likely going to be associated with the network access authentication
and hence the identity of the user can be traced back.

It's possible to trace it, yes.


Section 8 (paragraph 5)

OLD:

".. Hence, the extent of this
   vulnerability is small."

NEW:

" Hence, the extent of this
   vulnerability is small. It is possible to trace the culprit MN with an
established security association at the access router"




There are certainly some impacts on transport layer protocols due to the
way how the handover procedure works. I am sure that there are papers
available (maybe even written by the authors) that describe some of the
affects. It could be useful to point to such a paper.

We wrote a paper for ACM CCR a while ago (October 2001). More recent results
are documented in an upcoming book.


The last paragraph in Section 3.

OLD:

".. These delays contribute to the handover performance..."

NEW:

".. These delays contribute to the handover performance. See [fh-ccr] and
Chapter 20, Chapter 22 in [mi-book]"

Section 10:

ADD:

Thanks to Francis Dupont and Hannes Tschofenig for the GEN-ART and TSV-DIR
reviews.


References:

[fh-ccr] R. Koodli and C. E. Perkins., "Fast Handovers and Context Transfers
in Mobile Networks," ACM Computer Communications Review Special Issue on
Wireless Extensions to the Internet, October 2001.

[mi-book] R. Koodli and C. E. Perkins, "Mobile Internetworking with IPv6:
Concepts, Principles and Practices," John Wiley & Sons, June 2007.



Thanks for your review.

-Rajeev


Ciao
Hannes

-- 
http://people.nokia.net/~rajeev




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