This debate has nothing to do with the security properties of DNSSEC.
A basic assumption of the DNS is that what the authoritative server for
zone says is, well, authoritative. The structure of DNS itself entitles
JPNIC to point ac.jp wherever they want; by using a name within the .jp
domain, you are agreeing to act within JPNIC's domain of control. JPNIC
could set up an authoritative server for hpcl.titech.ac.jp completely
independently of you, regardless of DNSSEC, and from the perspective of
the DNS, that would be the right answer.
All DNSSEC does is make the assertions made in the DNS reliable -- it
does nothing to change the locus of control.
On the other hand, you can certainly use the DNSSEC protocol elements to
do peer-to-peer security, just like you can use private DNS servers, and
just like you can use TLS without trust anchors (i.e., with self-signed
certs). Just hand out the public half of your ZSK to people you want to
be able to verify names within your zone.
--Richard
Masataka Ohta wrote:
Christian Huitema wrote:
That is, security of DNSSEC involves third parties and is not end
to end.
That is indeed correct. An attacker can build a fake hierarchy of
"secure DNS" assertions and try to get it accepted. The attack can
succeed with the complicity of one of the authorities in the
hierarchy. It is a classic "attack by a trusted party".
Yes, the hierarchy has hops.
For my domain: "necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp", hierarechy of zones
have hops of ".", "jp", "ac.jp", "titech.ac.jp" and
"hpcl.titech.ac.jp". The authority hops are IANA, JPNIC, my
university, and my lab. Though you may have direct relationship
with IANA, JPNIC is the third party for both you and me.
If an intermediate authority has
been compromised, it can just as well insert a fake NS record --
that's not harder than a fake record signature.
So, with a compromised hop of an intermediate authority, record
signature on the faked next hop key can be generated.
Then, with a private key corresponding to the faked next hop key,
record signature on the faked second next hop key can be generated.
Then, with a private key corresponding to the faked second next
hop key, record signature on the faked third next hop key can be
generated.
Yes, security of DNSSEC is totally hop by hop.
Masataka Ohta
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