Nicolas Williams wrote:
On Wed, Apr 21, 2010 at 10:27:03AM -0700, The IESG wrote:
The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
the following document:
- 'Additional Master Secret Inputs for TLS '
<draft-hoffman-tls-master-secret-input-01.txt> as a Proposed Standard
I support publication of draft-hoffman-tls-master-secret-input-01.txt as
a Proposed Standard.
I'm fine with the "technology" in tls-master-secret-input.
It is a kind of inverse to TLS extractor/exporters and GSS_prf,
i.e. for cryptographically binding the TLS session to some other
information (secret or public) and provides a more rigid binding
than the gssapi channel_bindings facility (one that can not be ignored).
I have some nits with the text in section 1 and 2 because of the
lax terminology around randomness combined with the reference to
"(TLS) extensions with master secret input".
The document should carefully distinguish between data that
is merely unique and non-predictable, but public and fully known
to every observer and data that is "secret randomness" aka entropy.
There is no entropy in unique, non-predictable, _published_ data.
-Martin
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