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Re: [dhcwg] Last Call: <draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option-15.txt> (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) IPv4 and IPv6 Option for a Location Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)) to Proposed Standard

2012-06-25 09:16:58
On Jun 22, 2012, at 3:59 PM, Alissa Cooper wrote:
My understanding is that the option is encoded this way both for 
extensibility and because the Valid-For parameter is solely a property of the 
URI. Surely this is not the only instance of a DHCP option with a sub-option? 

What's in the draft is not suboptions—it's a whole special format requiring new 
code on all servers that implement it.   Suboptions don't exist in DHCPv6—just 
encapsulations of regular options, which I don't think make sense here either.

It may have been before I was paying attention, but I get the impression that 
related ground has already been trod in DHC, given that it also came up in 
GEOPRIV. http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/geopriv/current/msg08451.html

When the topic of suboptions first came up, it was because I proposed them as 
an alternative to a complicated internal option structure with lots of special 
code required in the server to implement.   But given that only one Location 
URI option is allowed, there's no need for suboptions.

I'm not sure the additional text is necessary given that there is an entire 
paragraph explaining considerations for servers in setting the Valid-For 
value. Furthermore, I don't see how "potential loss of service" is possible. 
We're talking about a URI with an expiration. When it expires, location 
recipients will no longer have access to the client's location, but it 
otherwise doesn't affect recipients' ability to use any "service" whatsoever.

You're right—don't know how I missed that.

Section 3.2 suggests that options shouldn't contain certain potentially 
harmful values, but this is a toothless restriction, since an attacker can 
simply ignore it.   In order for it to be effective, Section 3.2 should 
insist that DHCP clients reject forbidden URI formats.   Of course, this too 
is somewhat toothless, since any list of forbidden URI formats will 
necessarily fail to mention any future potentially harmful URIs that could 
arise.   It would be better to list which URIs _are_ permitted, and require 
the client to reject any URI that is not permitted.   The document is 
already set up to do this, but doesn't _actually_ do it, so fixing this 
should be quite easy.

In 3.3, I suggest replacing the following:

"This section specifies which URI types are acceptable as a location
  URI scheme (or type) for this DHCP Option:"

with

"URIs carried by this DHCP Option MUST have one of the following URI schemes:"

That's just as toothless.   Unless the client MUST reject these options, it MAY 
accept them.