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Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-spfbis-4408bis-19.txt> (Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1) to Proposed Standard

2013-09-11 23:56:31

Recommended text is as follows:

4.6.4.  DNS Lookup Limits

Was:
,--
SPF implementations MUST limit the total number of mechanisms and modifiers 
("terms") that cause any DNS query to 10 during SPF evaluation.  Specifically, 
the "include", "a", "mx", "ptr", and "exists" mechanisms as well as the 
"redirect" modifier count against this collective limit.  The "all", "ip4", and 
"ip6" mechanisms do not count against this limit.  If this number is exceeded 
during a check, a "permerror" MUST be returned.  The "exp" modifier does not 
count against this limit because the DNS lookup to fetch the explanation string 
occurs after the SPF record evaluation has been completed.
'--

Change to:
,---
SPF does not directly limit the number of DNS lookup transactions.  Instead, 
the number of mechanisms and the modifier term "redirect" MUST be limited to no 
more than 10 instances within the evaluation process.  The mechanisms "ip4", 
"ip6", and "all" and the "exp" modifier are excluded from being counted in this 
instance limitation. If this instance limit is exceeded during the evaluation 
process, a "permerror" MUST be returned.
'---

5.  Mechanism Definitions

Was:
,--
Several mechanisms rely on information fetched from the DNS.  For these DNS 
queries, except where noted, if the DNS server returns an error (RCODE other 
than 0 or 3) or the query times out, the mechanism stops and the topmost 
check_host() returns "temperror".  If the server returns "domain does not 
exist" (RCODE 3), then evaluation of the mechanism continues as if the server 
returned no error (RCODE 0) and zero answer records.
‘---

Add:
,---
See the recommended limits on "void lookups" defined in Section 4.6.4. DNS 
Lookup Limits.
‘---

3.4.  Record Size

Was:

,---
Note that when computing the sizes for replies to queries of the TXT format, 
one has to take into account any other TXT records published at the domain 
name.  Similarly, the sizes for replies to all queries related to SPF have to 
be evaluated to fit in a single 512 octet UDP packet.
‘---

Change to:
,---
Note that when computing the sizes for replies to queries of the TXT format, 
one has to take into account any other TXT records published at the domain 
name.  Similarly, the sizes for replies to all queries related to SPF have to 
be evaluated to fit in a single 512 octet DNS Message.
‘---

Add to:
11.5.3.  Macro Expansion
,---
It is not within SPF’s purview whether IPv6 or DNSSEC is being used.  IPv6 
(RFC2460) increased the minimum MTU size to 1280 octets.  DNSSEC is deployed 
with EDNS0 (RFC6891) to avoid TCP fallback.  EDNS0 suggests an MTU increase 
between 1280 and 1410 octets offers a reasonable result starting from a request 
of 4096 octets.  A 1410 MTU offers a 2.4 times payload increase over the 
assumed MTU of 576 octets and is widely supported by Customer Premise 
Equipment.  With increased MTUs being used with DNS over UDP, network 
amplification concerns increase accordingly.

SPF macros can utilize SPF parameters derived from email messages that can 
modulate the names being queried in several ways without publishing additional 
DNS resources.  The SPF macro feature permits malefactors a means to covertly 
orchestrate directed DDoS attacks from an array of compromised systems while 
expending little of their own resources.

Since SPF does not make use of a dedicated resource record type or naming 
convention, this leaves few solutions available to DNS operations in offering a 
means to mitigate possible abuse.  This type of abuse becomes rather pernicious 
when used in conjunction with synthetic domains now popular for tracking users 
without using web cookies.

However, email providers can mitigate this type of abuse by ignoring SPF 
records containing macros.  Very few domains make use of macros, and ignoring 
these records result in neutral handling.  Some large providers have admitted 
they make use of this strategy without experiencing any notable problem.  AOL 
began their support of SPF by saying they would use SPF to construct whitelists 
prior to receipt of email.  Clearly, such whitelisting practices tends to 
preclude benefits derived from macro use.
‘---

Regards,
Douglas Otis